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The Borrower’s Tale: A History of Poor
Debtors in Lochner Era New York City
ANNE FLEMING
When asked why he did not read over the loan documents before signing
them, John Doherty explained: “I was anxious to get the money, I didn’t
bother about it.” In February 1910, the twenty-three-year-old railroad
clerk walked into the ofﬁces of the Chesterkirk Company, a loan-sharking
operation with ofﬁces in lower Manhattan. He was looking to borrow some
money. Repayment was guaranteed by the only security Doherty had to
offer: his prospective wages and, in his words, his “reputation.” After a
brief investigation of Doherty’s creditworthiness, the loan was approved.
The ofﬁce manager placed a cross in lead pencil at the bottom of a lengthy
form and Doherty signed where indicated. He received $34.85 in exchange
for his promise to repay the loan principal plus $10.15 in combined fees
and interest in three months. The interest charged was signiﬁcantly greater
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than the 6 percent per year allowed in New York State. Doherty’s effective
annualized interest rate, including fees, was over 100 percent.1
By the early twentieth century, small loans secured by a lien on the bor-
rower’s future wages, or “salary loans,” had become a common source of
credit for urban working-class laborers. One 1908 study concluded that
there were at least thirty known salary lenders operating in New York
City, and likely many others whose presence could not be ascertained
because they did not advertise publicly. Anecdotal evidence conﬁrms
that the number of workers who patronized salary lenders was quite
high, at least in certain trades. One transportation company employee in
New York City estimated that at least 90 percent of his coworkers had
taken out salary loans. Of course, salary lenders were by no means the
only game in town. Chattel lenders, who made loans secured by a lien
on the borrower’s household goods, as well as pawnbrokers, who had
been providing credit to poor borrowers for centuries, also operated in
New York City.2
Early efforts to regulate small-scale lending failed to halt its spread or pre-
vent high interest charges. New York State strongly discouraged salary lend-
ing by capping the interest rate on salary loans at 6 percent and imposing
additional procedural requirements on lenders. These regulations made it
difﬁcult for lenders of small sums to turn a proﬁt, but did not eliminate the
business in New York. Demand for loans was high and, if the usury laws
could be evaded, the business was proﬁtable. The small loan business, there-
fore, operated in a shadow zone, outside the bounds of state and local law.3
1. “Q. Did you read the power of attorney over? A. No sir. Q. When you signed it? A. No
sir. Q. And you had no security to secure this loan except your prospective wages? A. And
my reputation.” Trial transcript, Record on Appeal, Thompson v. Erie Railroad Co., 207 N.
Y. 171 (1912) [Trial before the Municipal Court on December 22, 1911], Box 553, Vol. 127,
Series J2002-82A, New York State Court of Appeals Cases and Briefs, New York State
Archives (hereafter NYSA). The effective annualized interest rate including fees
(116.4993 percent) is calculated according to the standards for determining the annualized
percentage rate (APR) for a closed-end credit transaction set forth in Regulation Z of the
federal Truth in Lending Act, to allow comparison with the rates offered on present-day
short-terms loans such as payday loans. See 12 C.F.R. Part 226, Appendix J (rules for cal-
culating APR for closed-end credit).
2. On the number of salary lenders and borrowers, see Clarence W. Wassam, The Salary
Loan Business in New York City: A Report Prepared Under the Direction of the Bureau of
Social Research, New York School of Philanthropy (New York: Charities Publication
Committee, 1908), 25–26.
3. In the early nineteenth century, the legal rate was set at 7 percent per year. Dunham
v. Gould, 16 Johns. 367 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819); N.Y. Rev. Stat. vol. I, pt. II, ch. iv, tit. iii,
§ 1 (Packard and Van Benthuysen 1829) (codifying provisions of the Revised Laws
of 1813, vol. I, §§1–2, p. 64). In 1879, the law was amended to reduce the legal rate to
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Yet loan sharks, as chattel and salary lenders were often called, could
not escape the watchful eyes of progressive reformers. The explosive
growth of the small-scale lending industry and the mounting debt burden
it placed on poor borrowers captured the attention of reformers concerned
with urban poverty. Social reformers nationwide actively debated the pro-
blem and experimented with a range of solutions, from lending by philan-
thropic loan organizations and employer savings and loan associations to
education and legal reform.4 In the process, the lending industry emerged
as an arena of conﬂict in which the interests of debtors, creditors, refor-
mers, and judges vied for dominance. Much more than the fate
New York’s usury laws was at stake. To understand the political economy
of credit for the poor, reformers had to grapple with larger issues such as
the causes of the poverty in industrial cities, the nature of twentieth-century
American capitalism, and the limits of charity and freedom of contract.
Most importantly, in considering the desirability and constitutionality of
regulating private economic decision making, they had to consider the
proper relationship between the state and the market.5
Unlike their fellow progressives who battled the employers of child
labor and producers of impure food and drugs, lending reformers were
wary of heightened governmental interference in the marketplace.
Reformers did not believe that tighter regulation of interest rates could
tame the loan market or shield borrowers and lenders from the laws of
supply and demand. The anti-loan shark campaign confronted an industry
in which problems persisted despite strict usury regulations, some dating
6 percent per year. Laws of 1879, Chapter 538 (amending Title III, Chapter IV of Part II of
the Revised Statutes).
4. Arthur H. Ham, “The Court of Appeals and the Loan Shark,” The Survey 29 (January
11, 1913): 472–73 (advocating the organization of employees’ savings and loan associations
as an alternative to borrowing from loan sharks). In October 1912, reformers also released an
educational ﬁlm dramatizing the plight of a wage earner who borrows from a loan shark to
pay for his child’s medical expenses. “The Loan Shark in a Photo-Play,” The Survey 28
(September 21, 1912): 756.
5. Present-day debates over the uses of microﬁnance in the developing world also touch on
these key questions. On the poverty experts involved and their competing views on the
nature of capitalism, charity, and the regulation of markets, see Ananya Roy, Poverty
Capital: Microﬁnance and the Making of Development (New York: Routledge, 2010).
Fears of socialism and its perceived threat to capitalism may have served to fuel the search
for a solution that would reinforce the existing political economy. One Chicago business lea-
der wrote, in advocating for his plan to establish a business to lend small sums to workers:
“By uniting business and philanthropy . . . we will create an agent to ﬁght socialism. This is
not in any sense a charity. We merely ask that the speculative proﬁt be disregarded for the
purposes of our project. . . ..My own feeling about these problems is that too much is done in
the name of charity and that we are in danger of becoming bankrupt in self-respect.”
“Rosenwald Banks Sharks’ Nemesis,” Chicago Daily Tribune, January 3, 1914, 5.
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back to the colonial era. Instead of increased state involvement, the cam-
paign sought to solve the credit problems of the poor by drawing more
capitalists into the small-scale loan market and rallying large corporate
employers to the cause. Borrowers would be better protected from exploi-
tation, reformers reasoned, by fostering competition among lenders in the
marketplace, rather than by creating new regulations to be enforced by bor-
rowers in court. Reformers also called upon private corporate employers to
police the lending industry by refusing requests from loan sharks to collect
usurious interest from borrowers’ wages.6
The campaign against the “loan shark evil” thus highlights the limits of
progressive statism. The ideology of progressive reformers, dubbed
“Progressivism,” has been characterized by its support of government
intervention through regulation and opposition to an ideology of laissez-
faire free-market individualism.7 Yet, lending reformers envisioned a
relationship between the state and the lending industry that challenges,
in some respects, the classic narrative about reformers in this period. In
New York and nationwide, the anti-loan shark campaign advocated
measures to foster market-based competition with the sharks, such as by
forming remedial loan societies and raising interest rate ceilings to entice
more capital into the market. The New York Charity Organization
Society, for example, offered loans to would-be charity recipients in lieu
of or in addition to providing cash and in-kind relief. By providing poor
relief applicants with interest-free loans, the Society reasoned, it would
steal customers from the loan sharks and drive the bad actors out of
business. The Society also encouraged the recently formed Russell Sage
Foundation to study the lending industry and corresponded regularly
with Foundation leaders during the early years of the anti-loan shark cam-
paign, referring cases back and forth.8
6. On colonial usury laws, see James M. Ackerman, “Interest Rates and the Law: A
History of Usury,” Arizona State Law Journal 1981 (1981): 85. As in the early twentieth
century, these laws were frequently evaded or ignored throughout the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries. Opponents of usury laws deployed similar arguments in a wave of attacks
on usury regulation between 1825 and 1838. In the face of this onslaught, most states
retained their usury laws, but in weakened forms. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation
of American Law, 1780–1860 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 241–44.
7. See, for example, Thomas C. Leonard, “American Economic Reform in the Progressive
Era: Its Foundational Beliefs and Their Relation to Eugenics,” History of Political Economy
41 (2009): 114. For a partial historiography of progressivism, see Daniel T. Rodgers, “In
Search of Progressivism,” Reviews in American History 10 (1982): 113–32.
8. As the term “loan shark” was in common usage during this period, I have used it through-
out this study to refer to moneylenders who charged usurious rates of interest on loans of small
sums. The term had entered common usage by the turn of the last century. See, for example,
“War on the Loan Sharks,” Chicago Daily Tribune, November 17, 1900, 16. The New York
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The Foundation became the pre-eminent advocate of remedial lending
and of raising interest rate caps on small lenders to encourage legitimate
businesspeople with “honest capital” to enter the small loan business.
It argued that a “legislative remedy lies not in the passage of further restric-
tive laws but in the enactment of measures allowing a sufﬁcient rate of
interest to attract the capital of reputable men to the business, thus afford-
ing the competition necessary to keep proﬁts within reasonable limits.”
One Sage Foundation ofﬁcial scoffed at the foreign governments that
“attempted to regulate the business by making it a governmental mon-
opoly.” He noted with pride that in America, “under our individualistic
form of government such regulation has not been attempted.” Instead of
more rigid governmental controls on interest rates, reformers embraced
market mechanisms to curb the abuses of the small-scale lending industry.
In this way, small-scale lending reformers had much in common with anti-
trust advocates who opposed strong judicial intervention against restraints
of trade, but embraced limited regulation to clear the market of business
combinations that sought to suppress competition. Theirs was not an
expansive vision of state involvement in private economic relationships.9
Hebrew Free Loan Society also provided loans, but these were generally intended for Jewish
businesspeople rather than for the poor. Shelly Tenenbaum, A Credit to Their Community:
Jewish Loan Societies in the United States, 1880–1945 (Detroit: Wayne State University
Press, 1993), 48–49, 69, 98. For correspondence between the Society and the Foundation,
see, for example, Arthur Ham to Esther Baldwin (Charity Organization Society), January 18,
1916, “New York - S.L., 1916 Loan Shark Campaign” Folder, box 36, Russell Sage
Foundation Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (hereafter RSF LOC);
W. Frank Persons (C.O.S.) to Arthur Ham, December 15, 1910, “New York - S.L., 1911–
1913 Loan Shark Victims [3]” Folder, box 39, ibid.
9. On the Foundation’s advocacy for higher interest ceilings for small loans, see, for
example, Agent of the Russell Sage Foundation to William Church Osborn (counsel to
the Governor of New York), June 29, 1911, “New York - S.L., 1911 General” Folder,
box 38, ibid; and Arthur H. Ham, “A Year’s Progress in Remedial Loan Work,” in
Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Corrections (Fort Wayne, IN:
The Archer Printing Co., 1910), 487. Echoing this view, Buffalo-based reformer Ansley
Wilcox also rejected adopting municipal lending operations based on the European model
because, in America, “the paternalistic features of this plan would make it objectionable.”
Ansley Wilcox, “The Loan Shark Evil: Remedial Legislation, Its Possibilities and
Limitations,” The Legal Aid Review 9 (1911), “New York - S.L., Summaries Loan Shark
Campaign” Folder, box 41, RSF LOC. On antitrust policy debates, see Martin J. Sklar,
The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890–1916: The Market, the Law,
and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 203–53; see also
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Amendment of Sherman
Antitrust Law: Hearings on S. 6331 and 6440, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., 1908, 7–31 (statement
of Seth Low, chairman of the National Civic Federation).
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The outlook of the lending reform movement resonated with the jurispru-
dential philosophy of the age, which was skeptical of judicial and legislative
interference with privately negotiated economic arrangements. As celebrated
jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes explained in 1901, “[c]ourts are less and less
disposed to interfere with parties making such contracts as they choose, so
long as they interfere with no one’s welfare but their own.” At this time,
the common law of contracts disfavored judicial tampering with private bar-
gains as against “public policy.” Going a step further, turn-of-the-century
courts imported the common law presumption in favor of enforcing contracts
into constitutional law, recognizing a fundamental right against legislative
interference with individual “liberty of contract.” The paradigmatic case illus-
trating this legal philosophy is Lochner v. New York, in which the Supreme
Court dealt a blow to governmental efforts to regulate the weekly working
hours of bakers in the name of defending contractual freedom. In Lochner,
the Court overturned a New York law that limited bakers’ hours on the
grounds that the law was an “unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary inter-
ference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or to enter into
those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate or
necessary for the support of himself and his family.” According to
Lochner and its progeny, individual economic rights could not be infringed
except in the interest of the health, welfare, or safety of the public. The power
to determine whether a regulation was in the public interest, policing the line
between that which could be regulated (the public) and that which could not
(the private), fell to the courts.10
Borrowers were not the same as bakers, of course. There was a long tra-
dition of the state protecting borrowers from unscrupulous lenders; usury
laws, guarding against excess interest charges, number among the oldest
forms of economic regulation. When providing examples of “ancient”
laws that evidenced the long history of governmental interference with lib-
erty of contract, Justice Holmes cited usury laws and Sunday laws in his
Lochner dissent. No court dreamed of voiding interest rate caps entirely.
Rather, judicial discretion came into play in how courts construed loan
agreements, the reach of common law contract defenses, and regulations
related to disclosures and lender licensing. Judges’ decisions in small-scale
debt collection cases reveal the state in action, puzzling over how to bal-
ance protectionism and paternalism, the limits of freedom of contract,
and the legality of regulating private economic decision making.11
10. Daley v. People’s Building, Loan, & Savings Ass’n, 59 N.E. 452, 453 (Mass. 1901)
(Holmes, C.J.). Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
11. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes used the same
examples of longstanding forms of economic regulation––usury laws, Sunday laws, and
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The life stories of working-class borrowers who became indebted for small
sums of money, to charitable institutions or loan sharks, are at the center of
this history. The Borrower’s Tale draws on archival material from a variety of
sources—the casework records of the New York Charity Organization
Society, New York State civil and criminal case ﬁles, and the records of
the Russell Sage Foundation’s Department of Remedial Loans—to follow
poor New Yorkers as they crossed institutional boundaries, seeking money
to make ends meet. These records describe more powerfully than aggregated
data and statistics ever could the constraints and compulsions under which
borrowers exercised their “freedom of contract.” They detail the political
and economic forces that shaped the credit decisions of poor families, reveal-
ing the links between household economy and political economy.12
lotteries––in a pre-Lochner opinion in which he was in the majority. See Otis v. Parker, 187
U.S. 606, 609 (1903) (“No court would declare a usury law unconstitutional, even if every
member of it believed that Jeremy Bentham had said the last word on that subject, and had
shown for all time that such laws did more harm than good. The Sunday laws, no doubt,
would be sustained by a bench of judges, even if every one of them thought it superstitious
to make any day holy.”)
12. The Charity Organization Society collection, which contains over a thousand case-
work ﬁles documenting the Society’s dealings with individual families, includes a subset
of cases in which it is apparent that the household “under care” requested and received a
loan from the Society. These cases were less common than those in which households
received a grant of money or in-kind relief, but larger in number than the small scholarship
on loans as a form of charitable assistance would suggest. The cases highlighted here were
selected because the relief applicant clearly received a loan from the Society and the records
contain sufﬁcient detail to allow an historian to reconstruct the borrowers’ histories, loan
terms, and interactions with the Society. For other histories of poor families visited by the
New York Charity Organization Society, see Michael B. Katz, “Devotion and Ambiguity
in the Lives of a Poor Mother and Her Family in New York City, 1918–1919,” in
Reconstructing the Common Good in Education: Coping with Intractable American
Dilemmas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); Michael B. Katz, Improving Poor
People: The Welfare State, the “Underclass,” and Urban Schools as History (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1955), 144–172; Michael B. Katz, “The History of an
Impudent Poor Woman in New York City from 1918 to 1923,” in The Uses of Charity:
The Poor on Relief in the Nineteenth Century Metropolis, ed. Peter Mandler
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 227–46. The Society records provide
extraordinarily detailed information about the daily lives of the loan recipients, but limited
information about borrowing from non-philanthropic sources.
New York State appellate court records from debt collection cases and usury prosecu-
tions contain more detail about private lending operations and loan terms. (New York’s
trial court records for debt cases from this period have been destroyed.) The records on
appeal include loan documents and transcripts of testimony by borrowers and moneylenders,
loan terms, information about borrowers’ lives outside of their ﬁnacial dealings with money-
lenders. Additional evidence was located in 1900 and 1910 U.S. Census records and in
New York City directories. John Doherty’s case was among the few New York debt
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This study adds to the recent scholarship on Progressivism in practice—
ﬁne-grained, place-based studies of reform at the local level—but focuses clo-
sely on the relationships among reformers, industry, and the law that an earlier
generation of historians studied at the national level and outlined in broad
brushstrokes.13 This study also builds upon the creditor-centered work of his-
torians such as Mark H. Haller and John V. Alviti, but moves beyond their
reliance upon distinctions and categories, such as those separating proﬁt-
making credit providers from philanthropic credit providers, which were less
important to borrowers than they have been for historians. In focusing primar-
ily on the lived experience of poor borrowers, this article imports into the study
of household credit relationships an approachmapped out by several historians
of social welfare policy and institutions, who have attempted to reorient the
institution-centered historiography of social welfare to give greater weight to
the perspectives of welfare recipients. This study attempts to correct a similar
imbalance in the historiography of household credit relationships.14
collection cases that reached the appellate courts and was accordingly closely watched by
those involved in the compaign against the loan shark.
13. For recent scholarship, see, for example, Robert D. Johnston, The Radical Middle
Class: Populist Democracy and the Question of Capitalism in Progressive Era Portland,
Oregon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); and Michael Willrich, City of
Courts: Socializing Justice in Progressive Era Chicago (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003). Older, broad-based national studies of Progressive-era regulation
of industry include Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism (New York: Free Press
of Glencoe, 1963); and Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the
Progressive Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962).
14. Mark H. Haller and John V. Alviti, “Loansharking in American Cities: Historical
Analysis of a Marginal Enterprise,” American Journal of Legal History 21 (1977): 125–56.
Haller and Alviti provide a detailed history of changes in the business of salary lending in
the early twentieth century, but do not delve into the lives of borrowers. Louis Hyman’s history
of consumer credit in the twentieth century brieﬂy describes lending practices in this period.
Debtor Nation: The History of America in Red Ink (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2011), 13–16. Historian Peter Shergold’s Pittsburgh-based study gives greater attention to
the social conditions that created demand for small loans, but does not look at individual bor-
rowers and focuses more on the loan sharks than on their customers. Peter R. Shergold, “The
Loan Shark: The Small Loan Business in Early Twentieth-Century Pittsburgh,” Pennsylvania
History 45 (1978): 195–223. Another work in this vein is Michael Easterly, “Your Job Is Your
Credit: Creating a Market for Loans to Salaried Employees in New York City, 1885–1920”
(PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2008). Lendol Calder’s Financing the
American Dream contains a more sustained discussion of borrowers in the context of a trans-
formation in attitudes about consumptive debt during the early twentieth century. Lendol Glen
Calder Financing the American Dream: A Cultural History of Consumer Credit (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1999), 42–58. On the need to reorient the historiography of social
welfare to take into account the experience of those living in poverty, see Michael B. Katz,
Poverty and Policy in American History (New York: Academic Press, 1983), ix, 14; and
Stephen Pimpare, “Toward a New Welfare History,” Journal of Policy History 19 (2007): 239.
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The value of viewing the history of credit through the lived experiences
of working-class households is not solely in documenting the human dig-
nity and agency of poor borrowers, although this is certainly one of the
goals of this study. Rather, by looking at credit relationships from the bor-
rower’s point of view, a number of different institutions, groups, and pol-
icies that borrowers experienced as simultaneous and overlapping, but that
historians have usually studied separately from one another, are brought
into the same analytic frame. Thus, in contrast to prior work, this study
treats charitable and for-proﬁt lenders to the poor together as participants
in the same market for working-class credit. The debtors’ stories presented
here show how impoverished families organized their ﬁnancial lives, made
ends meet, and employed borrowing as a survival strategy.15
I. Life on the Margins: Two Borrowers’ Stories
Many working-class men and women in early twentieth-century American
cities had reason to borrow small sums and access to some form of credit.16
By the turn of the century, major structural changes in domestic and econ-
omic life had caused working-class households’ ﬁnancial emergencies to
become more frequent and more devastating. Urban laborers’ reliance on
wages as a primary or sole source of income rendered the hardship caused
by a sudden loss of employment especially acute, while seasonal layoffs
and the higher risk of injury in industrial work increased the likelihood
of unexpected loss of the means of self-support. Salary loans were a viable
business for lenders beginning in the late nineteenth century because of the
15. On the importance of studying the lived experience of poor people, see Katz,
Improving Poor People, 159. Other scholars, who examine the for-proﬁt side of the market,
contextualize loan sharks as precursors to the consumer credit providers that arose later to
serve middle-class borrowers. I question whether loan sharks are part of middle-class con-
sumer history, as the poor borrowers who patronized loan sharks rarely took out loans to
purchase consumer goods. Turn-of-the-century loan sharks might instead be viewed as pro-
viders of subsistence credit and part of the history of urban poverty, precursors to the payday
lenders and other “fringe banking” institutions that now serve the urban poor in our modern,
two-tiered credit system. On the modern divided credit market, see Lynn Drysdale and
Kathleen E. Keest, “The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace: The
Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury
Laws in Today’s Society,” South Carolina Law Review 51 (2000): 589–669.
16. I use the terms “poor” and “working-class” interchangeably throughout this study to
reﬂect that the borrowers studied lived in poverty while also, sometimes intermittently,
employed as domestic, manual, or industrial laborers. I use “poor” to mean having insufﬁ-
cient income and assets to maintain an adequate standard of living and “working-class” to
include those who work for wages through low-skilled clerical or manual labor.
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concentration of demand for small-scale credit in urban centers and the rise
of a class of salaried, industrial workers whose future income could serve
as collateral. Just as the demand for credit was elevated by the risks of
urban, industrial life, the characteristics of an urbanized and industrialized
workforce encouraged the expansion and proliferation of small-scale lend-
ing operations.17
This history of working-class borrowing begins with two case studies that
illustrate the conditions under which borrowers exercised their “freedom of
contract.” The two debtors whose stories are presented here, one who bor-
rowed from a loan shark and the other from the New York Charity
Organization Society, entered the market for working-class credit at differ-
ent points. The creditors from whom they borrowed engaged in different
lending practices and served different, although sometimes overlapping,
sections of the New York working class. Because these two lenders oper-
ated in separate sectors of the same credit market and each left behind
business records that are incomplete in different ways, each borrower’s
story enriches the other, creating an overall deeper and more textured picture
of working-class credit relationships in Progressive-era New York City.
Both borrowers lived and worked in New York City, the epicenter of the
battle over lending to the working class. Although New York cannot be
considered typical, the differences between New York and other urban cen-
ters are more a matter of scale than of kind. New York City’s large size and
the signiﬁcant number of large corporate employers and social reform
organizations located there made the credit problems of the working
class both more apparent and more urgent than in other cities. However,
loan sharks and the organizations that opposed them were active in small
and large cities across the Northeast and Midwest.18
17. One investigation found that 20 percent of New York City civil service employees had
borrowed from loan sharks at one time or another. “Fosdick Hits Hard at the Loan Sharks,”
New York Times, July 13, 1911, 18. Another, Robert Chapin’s study of New York City
workingmens’ families, found that only 42 out of 318 families (13.2 percent) reported bor-
rowing. Sixty-four percent of families, however, reported either a deﬁcit between income
and expenditures or that their income was barely sufﬁcient to meet expenditures (within a
range of $25). This suggests that borrowing may have been under-reported by the families
surveyed. Robert Coit Chapin, The Standard of Living Among Workingmen’s Families in
New York City (1909; repr. New York: Arno Press, 1971), 235–44 (Tables 119–28).
Louise More’s study of wage earners in New York City also found that the majority of
the 200 families she surveyed (49.5 percent) had incomes below the estimated minimum
required for a family to be self-supporting ($800). Louise Bolard More, Wage-earners’
Budgets: A Study of Standards and Cost of Living in in New York City (1907; repr.
New York: Arno Press, 1971), 6, 269–70.
18. On the large number of social reform organizations in New York, see John Louis
Recchiuti, Civic Engagement: Social Science and Progressive-Era Reform in New York
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Common themes emerge from these two stories, but neither can be con-
sidered representative. The variety of these borrowers’ approaches and
results underscores the multiplicity of individual experiences that cannot
be captured in a single case study. Poor people employed an array of
methods to ensure that they and their families had the necessities to sur-
vive, such as adequate food, housing, clothing, and medical care.
Although these case studies do not tell us how many borrowers used cer-
tain types of credit or patronized particular lenders, their experiences illus-
trate some of the survival strategies of working-class households.
John Doherty
We do not know why John Doherty was in need of a loan in February
1910. Doherty earned a decent wage of $70 per month as a clerk for the
Erie Railroad, where his older brother, James, also worked. He had no
known involvement with public or private charity. He lived with his
parents and younger brother, whom he and James supported with their
earnings. Doherty had attended school at least through his fourteenth birth-
day, before joining the workforce. The family’s ﬁnances were sufﬁciently
stable that Doherty’s youngest brother, George, sixteen, could go to school
full time.19
City (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 3. New York’s loan shark pro-
blems were similar to those in other industrial, urban centers. See, for example, Shergold,
“The Loan Shark: The Small Loan Business in Early Twentieth-Century Pittsburgh.” One
critical difference between Pittsburgh and New York was the scope of lending by charitable
organizations. Pittsburgh had hardly any. Ibid., 200. The published proceedings of the
National Federation of Remedial Loan Associations and the National Conference on
Social Welfare, two national associations of organizations dedicated to social reform, also
conﬁrm the essential similarity of moneylenders’ and reformers’ concerns about working-
class access to credit in cities across the country. See, for example, Proceedings of the
National Federation of Remedial Loan Associations (Baltimore: Lucas Brothers, Inc.,
1912); Ham, “A Year’s Progress in Remedial Loan Work.” In 1911, there were reportedly
100 moneylenders operating in Boston, 58 in Atlanta, 24 in Syracuse, 12 in Portland, Maine,
and between 200 and 300 in New York City. In response, crusades against the loan shark
were launched in more than a dozen cities from Augusta, Georgia to Des Moines, Iowa.
As of June 1911, twenty-two states and the District of Columbia were contemplating legis-
lation to address loan sharking. Proceedings of the National Federation of Remedial Loan
Associations, 3–4, 17.
19. The lawyer for Doherty’s employer objected to opposing counsel questioning Doherty
about his prior borrowing habits. Trial transcript, Thompson v. Erie Railroad Co., 207 N.Y.
171 (1912), Box 553, Vol. 127, Series J2002-82A, NYSA. On Doherty’s household, see
1900 United States Federal Census (Population Schedule), New York, New York, ED
662, Sheet 9, Dwelling 28, Family 185, Doherty household (Digital scan of original records
in the National Archives, Washington, DC), http://www.ancestry.com (December 12, 2009)
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Assuming Doherty and his brother James earned roughly equivalent sal-
aries, the income for Doherty’s family of ﬁve would have been approxi-
mately $1680 per year. This sum is higher than most estimates of the
cost of living for a family of ﬁve in New York City at this time.
Unexpected expenses, however, were frequently a cause for borrowing
among workingmen’s families. Sickness or death in the family ranked
among the most common reasons for taking out a loan. None of
Doherty’s household members died near this time, but a more distant
family member may have died or someone may have fallen ill.20
Although Doherty was born in New York, his father and grandparents
were Irish immigrants, as were many of his neighbors. Doherty’s father,
a retired druggist, had emigrated to New York in the 1850s from
Ireland, whereas his mother, the child of two Irish immigrants, was born
in New York. In Doherty’s East Side neighborhood more than 90 percent
of the population was born outside the United States or had one or more
parents born outside the United States. The neighborhood was overwhel-
mingly of white, European descent. Austrians and Irish dominated.
Doherty’s neighbors in his building on East 58th Street reﬂect the immi-
grant and working-class character of the neighborhood. Three out of the
four male household heads were foreign-born, naturalized citizens; the
lone ﬁrst-generation American was the son of two German immigrants.
Only one of the nineteen building occupants was the child of two native-
born parents. Most of Doherty’s neighbors were manual laborers or clerical
(hereafter Ancestry); and 1910 United States Federal Census (Population Schedule),
New York, New York, ED 1005, Sheet 7A, Dwelling 64, Family 135, Doherty household,
ibid.
20. Caroline Goodyear, “A Study of the Minimum Practicable Cost of an Adequate
Standard of Living in New York City,” in Proceedings of the New York State Conference
of Charities and Correction (Albany: J.B. Lyon Company, 1907), 51 (estimating the cost
of living for a self-supporting family of ﬁve in New York City at $1054 per year); More,
Wage-Earners’ Budgets, 269–70 ($800–$900 per year); and Chapin, The Standard of
Living Among Workingmen’s Families in New York City, 245–47 ($900–$1000 per year).
The differences among these estimates reﬂect in part researchers’ differing understandings
of what constituted an adequate standard of living. For more on budget studies and research-
ers’ attitudes about working-class spending, see Daniel Horowitz, The Morality of Spending:
Attitudes Toward the Consumer Society in America, 1875–1940 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1985), 50–66. On reasons for borrowing, see Wassam, The Salary Loan
Business in New York City, 19–21; and Lee K. Frankel, “The Relation Between Standards
of Living and Standards of Compensation,” in Proceedings of the New York State
Conference of Charities and Correction (Albany: J.B. Lyon Company, 1907), 24 (detailing
study of 100 families who applied for assistance from the United Hebrew Charities in 1905,
62 of which were in need because of sickness). A comparison of Doherty’s household mem-
bers between the 1900 and 1910 censuses shows no change in the family composition. The
1910 census was taken in April 1910, several months after Doherty took out a loan.
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workers. They included a barber, a bookkeeper, a stonecutter, a ﬁreman, a
packer at a coffee mill, a dock laborer, a city patrolman, and a
stenographer.21
The population density in this part of the city was high (100–149 per-
sons per acre), but not nearly as crowded as the Lower East Side, areas
of which housed more than 600 persons per acre. In 1910, New York
City’s population was booming. By 1910, the city contained half of the
state’s population. Immigration accounted for a signiﬁcant portion of the
population inﬂux. In a nation of immigrants, turn-of-the-century
Manhattan was an island of immigrants: of 2.3 million Manhattan dwellers,
more than 1.9 million were either foreign born or had one or more parents
born outside the United States.22
Although Doherty lived on the Upper East Side, the economic geography
of his universe can be mapped onto the streets of lower Manhattan. The main
ofﬁces of the Erie Railroad, Doherty’s employer, were housed in the
twenty-two-story Hudson Terminal Building at 50 Church Street (later
demolished to make room for the World Trade Center). A block away, the
lower Manhattan section of Broadway was lined with turn-of-the-century sky-
scrapers and was home to businesses such as the Union Telegraph Company
and the New York Telephone Company. Major moneylenders also had
ofﬁces in the area, where they could be patronized by the railroad brakemen,
21. Doherty’s neighborhood was between 56th Street and 73rd Street and Third Avenue
and the East River. The “non-white” population comprised less than 0.001 percent of the
total population; there were 89 non-white residents in a neighborhood of 74,594 people.
United States Census of Population and Housing, 1910: Summary Population and
Housing Characteristics: New York (Washington: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1913), 254
(Assembly District 18). On the Doherty household’s neighbors, see 1910 United States
Federal Census (Population Schedule), New York, New York, ED 1005, Sheet 7A,
Dwelling 64, Ancestry.
22. G. W. Bromley & Co., “Atlas of the City of New York, Borough of Manhattan” (Plate
27) 1911 (Digital scan of map in the New York Public Library, The Lionel Pincus and
Princess Firyal Map Division) http://digitalgallery.nypl.org (December 21, 2009). The
Borough of Manhattan alone grew by 26 percent between 1900 and 1910, from
1,850,095 to 2,331,542 people. During that time, the city’s population density also
increased, from 131.8 to 166.1 persons per acre. Report of the New York City
Commission on Congestion of Population (New York: Lecouver Press Company, 1911),
110. The portion of the New York State population living in urban areas had increased
from 72.9 percent in 1900 to 78.8 percent a decade later. Statewide, cities with a population
of at least 2500 grew by 34.3 percent, whereas the state’s rural population grew by less than
0.01 percent. United States Census of Population and Housing, 1910: Summary Population
and Housing Characteristics: New York (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce,
1913), 190–91, 208, 217. Immigrants from Austria, Germany, Russia, Ireland, and Italy
accounted for more than 80 percent of the Manhattanites born outside the United States.
Report of the New York City Commission on Congestion of Population, 6.
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clerks, and other working men who constituted their principal customer base.
Doherty’s salary loan broker, the Chesterkirk Company, was located a block
away from his ofﬁce in the sixteen-story Mail and Express Building on the
corner of Fulton Street and Broadway, near the branch ofﬁce of another
loan broker, D.H. Tolman. Doherty could also have easily borrowed from
Buell & Company, Wells & Co., or L.G. Smith, all nearby loan ofﬁces.23
When Doherty walked in the door of the Chesterkirk ofﬁce, he spoke
with the manager, Miss Jessie Dennington, whom he had met before on
social occasions. Dennington wrote down Doherty’s address, place of
employment, length of employment, and salary. Doherty then left to
wait for the verdict on his loan application. Soon after, a man from
Chesterkirk arrived at the ofﬁces of Doherty’s employer to inform him
that his application had been approved. Doherty returned to the loan
ofﬁce that day and signed the required papers. As Doherty learned later,
the document he signed was not a contract or promissory note agreeing
to repayment of the sum borrowed. Rather, it was a blank power of attor-
ney, a document granting the agent named in the document wide-ranging
authority to conduct business in Doherty’s name. Dennington later ﬁlled in
the blank designating Doherty’s agent with the name “Stella Blanding,”
exactly as she did with all the blank powers of attorney signed that
month. Stella Blanding, a resident of Maine, could then conduct the entire
loan transaction in Maine, which had repealed its usury laws in the mid-
nineteenth century and consequently became a safe haven for loan sharks
nationwide.24
23. The company relocated its ofﬁces to the Terminal Building after it was completed in
1908. Trow Co-partnership and Corporation Directory of the City of New York, 1909, 239–
40, 568, 834. For a list of loan ofﬁce locations in New York City and their addresses in 1908,
see Wassam, The Salary Loan Business in New York City, Appendix XIX. Wassam also
includes a list of the most common occupations of the 250 loan applicants sampled, in
Appendix XXVIII. “Machinist” was the most common occupation among those included
in the sample. On the height of lower Manhattan buildings, see Sarah Bradford Landau
and Carl W. Condit, Rise of the New York Skyscraper (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1999), 213.
24. We do not know if Doherty’s connection to Dennington led him to patronize this par-
ticular loan ofﬁce. Like many loan ofﬁces, Chesterkirk employed a woman as manager.
Female employers could be paid less than their male equivalents and were, companies
believed, more likely to be treated respectfully and nonviolently by male borrowers.
Many collection agents were also women. Known as “bawler-outs,” female debt collectors
tracked down the delinquent borrower at home or work and loudly criticized him for his fail-
ure to pay back the money borrowed. Haller and Alviti, “Loansharking in American Cities,”
130, 134; Calder, Financing the American Dream, 53–54. On Blanding, see Trial transcript,
Thompson v. Erie Railroad Co., 207 N.Y. 171 (1912), Box 553, Vol. 127, Series
J2002-82A, NYSA. On Maine as a loan shark haven, see Rolf Nugent, “The Changing
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Even if Doherty had read the document he signed, it would have made
little sense to him. It began:
Whereas, I desire to have made, executed, negotiated, delivered, and sold cer-
tain notes to the aggregate amount of $90.00 or less for which I shall be
responsible as maker in the City of Portland, State of Maine, without being
then and there present personally, now, therefore, know all men by these pre-
sents that I have made, constituted, created and appointed, and by these pre-
sents, do make, constitute and appoint ________ of the City of Portland,
State of Maine, my true and lawful authorized agent and attorney, with full
power to do and perform each and every act and thing which said attorney
may deem it necessary or desirable to do or perform, to the end that I may
accomplish aforesaid result.25
Doherty, of course, had no idea that he was giving such power to an uni-
dentiﬁed resident of Portland, Maine, much less that the loan transaction
would be done in Maine rather than New York City.
Other New York City borrowers also inadvertently gave power of attorney
to Stella Blanding, a 27-year-old resident of Portland, Maine. Blanding was
crucial to the schemes of several New York City loan brokers—
Chesterkirk, Burt Brothers, and Walter Graham among them—to transact
their business beyond the reach of New York’s usury laws. Blanding worked
for the State Trading Corporation, which operated several New York City loan
ofﬁces. State Trading had no ofﬁce in Maine and Blanding was its only
employee in the state. Her role in each transaction, for which she was paid
by State Trading, was simple: pick up the executed power-of-attorney from
her Maine post ofﬁce box, take it to N.W. Hasten Company, execute a series
of promissory notes in the name of the borrower for a loan from N.W. Hasten
Company, and mail the loaned funds to the borrower in New York.26
In Doherty’s case, the transaction worked as follows: ﬁrst, Blanding
arranged for the acquisition of Doherty’s loan by N.W. Hasten Company
of Portland, Maine. (As Doherty’s agent, Blanding had a legal duty to
act in his best interest. Yet, in spite of that obligation, she did not make
Philosophy of Small Loan Regulation,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 196 (1938): 205.
25. Record on Appeal, Thompson v. Erie Railroad Co., 207 N.Y. 171 (1912), Box 553,
Vol. 127, Series J2002-82A, NYSA.
26. Blanding lived in Providence, Rhode Island prior to her employment by the State
Trading Company. She was recommended for the Portland position by a Providence
acquaintance who worked in the Company’s Rhode Island ofﬁce. Blanding received the
job offer by mail from the Company’s New York ofﬁce, along with instructions to go to
the N.W. Hasten Company’s ofﬁces in Portland. Trial transcript, Record on Appeal,
People v. Bauman, 155 A.D. 935 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913) (Trial before the Court of
Special Sessions on December 16, 1912), New York State Library (hereafter NYSL).
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any effort to shop around for the best possible loan terms; she only dealt
with N.W. Hasten Company). Two days after Doherty visited the
Chesterkirk ofﬁces in New York City, Blanding executed a note on behalf
of Doherty promising to repay $45 to the N.W. Hasten Company. From N.
W. Hasten she received $37, which she mailed to Doherty, minus the cost
of the money order. Doherty received a money order for $36.85, which was
further reduced by Chesterkirk’s $2 brokerage fee.27
April 3—the date Doherty’s payment was due—came and went, but
Doherty did not repay the loan. On or close to April 21, Doherty’s
employer, the Erie Railroad, received a demand that the railroad pay the
sum of $60.50 out of Doherty’s wages to make good on the debt. The
demand letter was accompanied by a copy of a wage assignment executed
by Doherty’s attorney-in-fact, Stella Blanding, along with a list of legal
citations concerning the “absolute right” of every employee to assign his
wages. (This was included, it seems, just in case Doherty’s employer
thought of contacting a lawyer). When Erie refused the demand, the lender
sued the railroad for the amount owed.28
Mary Lafferty
By July 1903, Mary Lafferty was out of options. In May, Lafferty and her
husband, John, along with their two children, had been evicted from their
apartment only two months after moving there. They had paid half a
month’s rent and then had fallen behind. Soon, the insurance agent and
other creditors came calling. After being put out of their apartment and
without money for a new deposit, the family moved in with Lafferty’s
parents and three younger siblings. Tensions ran high as space and
resources were stretched to the limit. A month later, Lafferty’s husband,
a waiter, left for work and failed to return. Without any means of support-
ing her family, Lafferty and the children leaned on her mother and
brother.29
27. Salary loans generally ranged in size from $10 to $40. Irving S. Michelman,
Consumer Finance: A Case History in American Business (New York: F. Fell, 1966), 78.
28. Record on Appeal, Thompson v. Erie Railroad Co., 207 N.Y. 171 (1912), Box 553,
Vol. 127, Series J2002-82A, NYSA. In June, when a collector from the lender called at
Doherty’s ofﬁce, Doherty offered to pay $50 to satisfy the debt. The offer was refused. Ibid.
29. This narrative has been constructed from the documents in the New York Charity
Organization Society’s case ﬁle R619. The names of the family members, neighbors, and
friends involved in each of the New York Charity Organization Society’s cases cited in
this study have been changed to protect their privacy. All citations within these records
are to the Society’s case notes, unless otherwise indicated. R619 Folder, Box 265,
Community Service Society Collection, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia
University in the City of New York (hereafter CSSC).
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The family budget, however, was already past the breaking point.
Lafferty’s mother, Sarah Boyle, did not earn enough to cover the rent,
much less feed seven people, from her job as a janitor in the Bronx apart-
ment building where they lived. To make ends meet, Boyle scraped
together $2–$3 per week doing odd jobs for the building residents. One
of her sons, George, worked at a dry goods store for $6 a week. Her hus-
band, Frank, drank heavily and was not a reliable earner. By early July,
Lafferty had pawned everything of value that she owned. She had tried
and failed to obtain relief from her local Catholic parish. To compound
her problems, her daughter, Florence, became ill. There was no food in
the house. Lafferty turned to the New York Department of Public
Charities for assistance, who referred her to the New York Charity
Organization Society.30
The family would become well known to the Society in the coming
months. Lafferty had not previously applied for assistance, but the
Boyles had a record with the agency. Like many working-class families,
the Boyles had been involved from time to time with various organizations
and public institutions for the poor, including the city facilities on
Blackwell’s Island and the Mount Loretto home for destitute children on
Staten Island. Frank Boyle may have become known to the Society through
its antimendicancy work with the New York Police Department’s
“vagrancy squad,” which arrested vagrants, beggars, and swindlers.
Frank Boyle was committed for vagrancy in December 1902.31
After the family’s immediate need for food was met by 75 in relief from
the Society, Lafferty enlisted the Society’s help in locating her husband.
He “was always a good husband,” she explained, but had “become
tired” of assisting her parents and brothers. On her own initiative,
30. The building was located on 174th Street in the Bronx. The Society records refer to
this parish as “R.C. Church ‘Tremont.’” This appears to refer to St. Joseph’s Roman
Catholic Church, built in 1902 on Bathgate Avenue in the Bronx, just north of East
Tremont Avenue. Lafferty told the Society that she was denied aid by the church because
she married a Protestant. R619 Folder, Box 265, CSSC.
31. Two of Boyle’s children had been committed to an institution for destitute boys on
Mount Loretto, Staten Island run by the Mission of the Immaculate Virgin for the
Protection of Homeless and Destitute Children. Blackwell’s Island (since renamed
Roosevelt Island) housed an almshouse, penitentiary, workhouse, and hospital for the desti-
tute. New York Charities Directory (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1903), 105, 283,
289–90. On the Society’s antimendicancy work, see Charity Organization Society of the
City of New York, Twenty-First Annual Report (New York: Evening Post Printing
House, 1903), 55. Frank Boyle may also have been committed “on confession,” or volunta-
rily, so as to secure treatment at the Blackwell’s Island Hospital. On commitment “on con-
fession,” see William W. Sanger, The History of Prostitution (New York: Medical
Publishing Co., 1919), 634.
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Lafferty wrote to the police chiefs of Montreal and Quebec, where she
believed her husband may have ﬂed, for information on his whereabouts.
On her urging, an agent of the Society’s Bronx District ofﬁce wrote to
the police in Boston. Despite these attempts, John Lafferty was not
found. In mid-July, Mary Lafferty’s brother sent word of a job for her at
a hotel in Saratoga, New York, but she decided to remain in the city in
the hope that her husband would write to her.
By early August, Lafferty conceded that her husband would not return
home and had run out of leads. Upon request, she obtained a loan from
the Society of $2.50 to cover the cost of her chambermaid’s uniform
and passage from Troy to Saratoga. Sadly, Saratoga proved to be another
disappointment. Upon arrival, she learned that her brother, “like all the rest
of them,” had misled her. He had lost all of his money on the horse races
and planned to leave for Connecticut the next day. He had secured neither
job nor housing for her, and she was forced to go in search of both. If she
had not lost her return ticket to New York, she would have left immedi-
ately. Instead, she found a hotel job that paid less than $1 a week.
With some difﬁculty, Mary Lafferty repaid the $2.50 borrowed from
the Society, although not as promptly as promised. Along with her pro-
fuse apologies for the delay in repayment, she sent word to the Society
asking whether there had been any news of her husband’s whereabouts.
She asked the Society agent to write to the police chief of Newport,
Rhode Island for information. (This attempt was unsuccessful). She
also shared news from a waiter recently arrived in Saratoga from
Connecticut, who reported spotting her husband at a cafe in Hartford.
Lafferty asked the Society agent to pay a visit to her parents, whose
annoyance at having to care for her children in their home had escalated
to threats that they would not keep the children any longer if she did not
send money soon.
By September, Lafferty was back in New York, where she again enlisted
the Society’s help in ﬁnding her husband. She cajoled the Society agent
into interviewing a few waiters and a friend of her husband on the suspi-
cion that they might have information concerning his whereabouts.
Meanwhile, she found work as a saleswoman at R.H. Macy & Co.
The Society’s further investigations turned up nothing. By December,
Lafferty was discouraged. She swore that if her husband did not appear
by Christmas, or “or at least remember his little children on that day,”
then she would be “through with him forever.”
Christmas passed without any word. Five days later, however, a waiter at
the Vanderbilt Hotel disclosed that John Lafferty was alive and well, living
in Hartford. Armed with this news and a loan of $4 for carfare from the
Society, Lafferty set out the next day for Hartford to recover her husband.
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According to Mary Lafferty, her husband, who was living under an
assumed name, was “delighted to see her” when she knocked on his board-
ing house room door the following evening. She returned the $4 loan a
week later, when she returned brieﬂy to her job at Macy’s while waiting
for their rooms in Hartford to be prepared. The Laffertys expressed their
sincere gratitude to the Society for its assistance and interest in their
case and suggested that they had both learned a “good lesson.” The
Society closed their case a few months later. The “cause of need” on the
ﬁle was marked “Disregard of Family Ties” and “Lack of Judgement.”
II. Managing Money on the Margins: The Need for Borrowing
As these case studies illustrate, borrowing and lending played a vital role in
the everyday lives of the urban working class in turn-of-the-century
American cities. Families and individuals were enmeshed in a web of formal
and informal credit relationships with relatives, local merchants, landlords,
moneylenders, and charitable organizations. Within the span of a year, the
Laffertys borrowed from family members, organized charity, their landlord,
and a pawnbroker. Yet, borrowers did not create, negotiate, or terminate
these relationships separately from all others. Like working, saving, or buy-
ing insurance, borrowing was just one of many survival strategies.
Few poor households could get by on a single source of income.
Households cobbled together enough to survive the week from a variety
of sources, which often varied fromweek to week.Wages were an important
part of this equation. To avoid dependence on charity, friends, family mem-
bers, or borrowing, families generally required at least one wage earner with
steady employment. At the same time, reliance on a single wage earner was
risky, given the low wages of many working-class jobs and the frequency of
job loss because of poor performance, injury, or lack of work. A worker
might also be put out of work because of a union strike. The most stable
households, such as the Dohertys, had two steady wage earners who both
worked in relatively high-paying jobs. As a result of this income, the
Dohertys did not need to supplement their income through charity or the
wages of the oldest or youngest household members.32
32. More, Wage-Earners’ Budgets, 83. In January 1913, John Lafferty, a waiter, again
appealed to the Society for aid because the cooks and kitchen men at his restaurant were out
on strike, leaving the waiters without any work. Another borrower, employed as a railroad fore-
man at a good monthly salary by the O’Rourke Engineering & Construction Company, was out
of work for more than 6 months because of a strike in 1903. R624 Folder, Box 265, CSSC.
Another family that appealed to the Society for help in April 1907 reported that the father
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In contrast, households without the steady income of a single breadwin-
ner, such as Mary Lafferty’s parents, needed the income of both the female
household head and the oldest child to support a family. Elizabeth York, a
thirty-nine-year-old native-born New Yorker and mother of four who bor-
rowed from the Charity Organization Society, relied on her daughters’
wages, supplemented by unpredictable contributions from her husband, a
carpenter, and her own earnings from occasional laundering, cleaning,
and other domestic work. Working male household members usually
earned more than their female counterparts, who often did poorly paid,
unsteady domestic work. Janitress positions, such as that eventually
secured by Elizabeth York, sometimes provided only enough to reduce
or cover the monthly rent. Food, clothing, and other necessities could
not be purchased without additional income.33
Monetary assistance from state or municipal sources is notably absent
from most household budgets. By 1900, New York City had done away
with “outdoor” poor relief, public funds disbursed directly by the gov-
ernment to the poor living outside institutional settings. The New Deal
era social welfare programs did not yet exist and mothers’ pensions
would not be instituted in New York State until 1915, over the vigorous
objections of private charitable organizations including the New York
Charity Organization Society. State assistance was provided through
institutions such as municipal clinics, almshouses, and hospitals; public
funds were provided to some privately run institutions for the care of
delinquent children. Families seeking public assistance had a difﬁcult
choice: keep the family together and potentially forgo help, or allow
the household to be broken up by the institutionalization of its members.
Mary Lafferty struggled with this choice many times, although she was
able for the most part to avoid commitment of her children to public
facilities.34
and principal wage earner, a painter, had lost income and been forced to perform odd jobs while
the union was out on strike. In December, the painters’ union again went on strike, but the man
continued working under protest of the union. R709 Folder, Box 269, CSSC. Industrial acci-
dents did not play a role in any of the household ﬁnancial crises that precipitated borrowing
in the cases presented here. Accidental injury and death, however, were realities of working
life for many Americans and, in the era before worker’s compensation systems, often ﬁnancially
devastating. On the industrial-accident crisis at the turn of the last century and its impact on
American accident law, see John Fabian Witt, The Accidental Republic: Crippled
Workingmen, Destitute Widows, and the Remaking of American Law (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2004).
33. The York narrative has been constructed from the documents in the New York Charity
Organization Society’s case ﬁle R701. R701 Folder, Box 268, CSSC.
34. On the abolition of outdoor relief see Proceedings of the New York State Conference of
Charities and Correction, vol. 12 (Albany: J.B. Lyon Company, 1911), 64. On organized
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Children were alternately the cause and the cure for ﬁnancial hardship.
All of the borrowing households in this study included three or more
children, which is more or less in line with the average household size
nationwide (4.8 persons). Many, such as Russian immigrant Anna
Gruzinsky, who borrowed money from the Charity Organization
Society beginning in 1904, lost children in their infancy. In this period,
roughly one to two infants out of every ten born in New York City died
before reaching the age of one year. Children who survived required
food, medical care, and, often, if both parents worked outside the
home, childcare. Working mothers, such as Mary Lafferty and Anna
Gruzinsky, relied upon family members or charitable organizations to
watch their children. A sick child could mean more medical expenses
and job loss if time away from work was required to obtain medical
care. Once children reached adolescence, however, they could add
their wages to the household’s income. Unmarried working daughters,
like their fathers, were expected to turn over their pay envelopes to
their mothers on payday.35
charity’s opposition to public outdoor relief, see Katz, Poverty and Policy in American
History, 191. Poor relief in New York City was terminated in two phases. Cash relief to
the poor stopped in the 1870s and distribution of coal to the poor was terminated in
1898. For a detailed analysis of the forces at work behind these policy changes, see
Adonica Yen-Mui Lui, “Party Machines, State Structure, And Social Policies: The
Abolition of Public Outdoor Relief in New York City, 1874–1898” (PhD diss., Harvard
University, 1993). The New York State mothers’ pensions legislation was passed as
Chapter 228 of the Laws of 1915. For a history of the mothers’ pension movement nation-
wide, see Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social
Policy in the United States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). In Brooklyn,
after the abolition of outdoor poor relief and before the city’s consolidation into Greater
New York in 1898, the city government distributed public funds among private charitable
organizations to provide relief for the poor. “New York Charities In Conference,” The
Survey (May 25, 1912): 325–27. New York City ceased this practice in 1898, but continued
to provide public funds to some institutions for the care of delinquent children. “Public Aid
Through Private Organizations,” The Survey (May 25, 1912): 327–28. The Lafferty house-
hold was referred to the Charity Organization Society again in January 1906 after the Bureau
of Dependent Children received an application for commitment of three of the children.
Later that year, Mary Lafferty again considered breaking up the family. She explained to
the Society that she was not earning enough at Macy’s to support the children and “thinks
she will have to place the oldest boy in an institution.” R619 Folder, Box 265, CSSC.
35. For statistics on household size, see Frances E. Kobrin, “The Fall in Household Size
and the Rise of the Primary Individual in the United States,” Demography 13 (1976): 129.
The average household size in Manhattan in 1900 may have been slightly lower, at 4.5 per-
sons per household. This estimate is derived from census data on numbers of private families
and total persons in private families for New York County, New York in 1900. Social
Explorer, www.socialexplorer.com (February 20, 2009). For case notes on the Gruzinsky
family, see R649 Folder, Box 266, CSSC. On pay envelopes, see Kathy Peiss, Cheap
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For women with children, desertion was also a concern. Male household
heads, however, did not always leave for good. Like John Lafferty, hus-
bands often returned home after weeks or months of separation.
Meanwhile, deserted wives struggled with whether they should pursue
their husbands’ return and monetary support through legal action. John
Lafferty deserted his family multiple times during the course of their invol-
vement with the Charity Organization Society. Slightly less than two years
after the family reunited and moved to Hartford, John Lafferty went out to
work in the morning and did not come back that evening or the following
day. Mary Lafferty and her children returned to New York and moved back
in with her mother. Mary Lafferty eventually tracked him down in
Baltimore in August 1906, where he “begged her to return to him.” She
was conﬂicted. As she explained to the Society, she did “not know whether
she ought to return to him or not, as she feels she cannot trust him, but she
is very much discouraged trying to support herself and the three children;
she is still working at Macy’s earning $7. a week.” The Laffertys even-
tually reunited but, four years later, Mary Lafferty again suspected that
her husband was lying to her about his earnings and was putting money
aside so that he could “run away again.” John Lafferty deserted the family
again in January of 1914.36
Much like husbands, household expenses were unpredictable and might
vary from week to week. Housing, medical expenses, and burial costs were
the most common expenses that families had to manage on short notice. An
eviction notice from the landlord often caused a struggling family to seek
outside assistance, through charity or a loan, to pay overdue rent or relo-
cate. Many poor families moved frequently, although often within the
same neighborhood. The Lafferty family had ﬁfteen different addresses
on record with the Society between 1903 and 1918, almost all in the
Bronx. Medicine and doctors’ bills could be a considerable expense. As
Harry Roland, a thirty-three-year-old railroad track engineer and father of
a one-year-old son, wrote to explain his inability to make any payment
on his loan from the Society: “On Feby 20th my child took sick, it was
Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in New York City, 1880 to 1920 (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1986), 70–71; and Elizabeth Ewen, Immigrant Women in the
Land of Dollars: Life and Culture on the Lower East Side, 1890–1925 (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1985), 104–5.
36. R619 Folder, Box 265, CSSC. On the creation of an antidesertion system in New York
and the involvement of the Charity Organization Society in these efforts, see Anna R. Igra,
Wives Without Husbands: Marriage, Desertion, & Welfare in New York, 1900–1935 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 28–44; Frank Dekker Watson, The Charity
Organization Movement in the United States (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1922),
319–23.
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necessary to have the Doctor once a day at two (200) dollars per visit and
ﬁrst visit cost 300 that made a total of ﬁfteen (1500) dollars. Medicines cost
on an average of ﬁfty cents per day_ total $300 extras that had to be got say
$200 total – $2000 and all paid and one half of this month’s rent, therefor if
sickness had not come to my house, it was my intention to send you
$1500.”37
Even when medicine failed and a family member died, the bills kept
coming. Families without burial insurance would go into debt to provide
an appropriate funeral for a loved one. For this reason, many poor families
insisted, often against the wishes of charity workers, on maintaining insur-
ance policies to cover family burial costs. In some cases, the importance of
funeral displays led families to pay insurance premiums rather than buying
food, clothing, or fuel. Insurance was so common that the Charity
Organization Society included a blank on its intake form for “Insurance,
Lodge or Beneﬁt Society.” Mary Lafferty used her insurance agent as a
reference on her employment application to work at Macy’s, as he had
been visiting the family for more than ten years.38
Savings could also blunt the impact of emergency expenses, but few
households were able to put enough money aside. Households that were
able to save might weather small emergencies, but still experienced short-
falls when expenses piled up. Anna Gruzinsky had saved more than $30 by
June 1906, but exhausted these savings and more after her husband pur-
chased tools and the family moved. A loan from the Society bridged the
gap between the household’s expenses and resources. Harry Roland
explained to the Society that he had saved $750 before he lost several
months of wages because of a strike. These savings were exhausted over
the course of six months from the cost of supporting the Roland family
and his wife’s elderly parents.39
Families in need often looked ﬁrst to local sources of credit. Family,
neighbors, and friends could be sources of relief or informal loans,
although ongoing assistance or unpaid loans could strain personal and
familial relationships. Parents might assist their adult children with child-
care, whereas the adult children, such as Mary Lafferty before her husband
deserted her, might support their elderly parents ﬁnancially. Neighbors and
37. Roland to Mrs. C.L. Reeds (C.O.S.), March 9, 1904, R624 Folder, Box 265, CSSC.
38. Anna Gruzinsky, for example, borrowed $5 from her children’s nursery in order to pay
for her baby’s funeral. R649 Folder, Box 266, CSSC (Gruzinsky). On debts for weddings
and funerals, see Ewen, Immigrant Women in the Land of Dollars, 238. For examples of
intake forms, see, e.g., R701 Folder, Box 268, CSSC. On Mary Lafferty, see R619
Folder, Box 265, CSSC.
39. R649 Folder, Box 266, CSSC (Gruzinsky); R624 Folder, Box 265, CSSC (Roland).
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friends frequently assisted one another during difﬁcult times, with the
expectation that the favor would create a reciprocal obligation. Anna
Gruzinsky’s neighbor paid a visit to the Charity Organization Society on
her behalf, to explain that the neighbors would take up a collection for
the family if the Society committed to pay one month’s rent. Author
Michael Gold, in his autobiographical novel about Jewish life on
New York’s Lower East Side, Jews Without Money, describes how his
mother would take up a collection in their building if a family was in
danger of being evicted. Borrowing privileges could, of course, be abused;
John Lafferty borrowed $9 from a friend with whom the Lafferty family
was living on the day he disappeared in 1914, saying he was going to
get new rooms. Instead, he skipped with the money.40
Local merchants were also an important source of informal credit, some-
times provided voluntarily and sometimes unwillingly, such as when custo-
mers failed to pay their bills. The landlord, the corner grocer, the insurance
salesman, the baker, the ice man, and the moving company were all potential
creditors. Merchants allowed customers to purchase consumer goods “on
time” or on the “installment plan,” whereby the customer would take posses-
sion of the goods and gradually pay off the purchase price through regular
payment installments. Clothing, sewing machines, furniture, and even medi-
cal care could be ﬁnanced in this way. The number of creditors who visited
the Lafferty and York families suggests that a number of local merchants and
businesspeople provided them with credit.41
There was no uniform collection process for unpaid debts owed to local
merchants. Items purchased “on time” could be repossessed if the customer
missed a payment. The Laffertys had their furniture seized by the seller, the
40. Jane Addams, in Chicago, also observed the “kindness of the poor to each other” in
sharing or giving food and money to one another. Jane Addams, Twenty Years at
Hull-House (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1910), 162–63. According to a family
friend, prior to her husband’s desertion, Mary Lafferty “sacriﬁced her husband in order to
aid her family.” This was a purported cause of John Lafferty’s desertion. R619 Folder,
Box 265, CSSC. For a discussion of the “gift economy” among Italian immigrants on the
Lower East Side in this period, see William Q. Boelhower, “Pushcart Economics: The
Italians in New York,” in Public Space, Private Lives: Race, Gender, Class, and
Citizenship in New York, 1890–1929, ed. Anna Scacchi and William Boelhower
(Amsterdam: VU University Press, 2004), 97–110. On modern networks created among
the urban poor by informal borrowing and lending, or “swapping,” see Carol B. Stack,
All Our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community (New York: Basic Books,
1997), 32–44. On the Gruzinsky case, see R649 Folder, Box 266, CSSC. Michael Gold,
Jews Without Money (1930; repr. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2004), 161–62.
41. The ﬁnancing of sewing machines on the installment plan was sufﬁciently common
that the Society wrote to the Singer Sewing Machine Company in order to obtain a missing
borrower’s address. R717 Folder, Box 269, CSSC. Abortions could also be purchased on the
installment plan. Ewen, Immigrant Women in the Land of Dollars, 133.
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Duetch Brothers Company, after the family fell behind on its payments.
Grocers and small merchants seem not to have made use of the legal sys-
tem to recover unpaid debts, unlike landlords. An individual family could
rack up a large debt to the landlord, but the landlord had recourse to the
courts to evict nonpaying tenants. Legal action and eviction were often
poor methods to collect payment, however. Eviction allowed the landlord
to place a new, paying household in the rented rooms, but usually not to
collect back rent. A landlord might be better off allowing a family to
catch up on unpaid rent, rather than pursue a court case to terminate its
tenancy.42
Private moneylenders and the Charity Organization Society were two
additional sources of credit for working-class New Yorkers. Needy
families often looked to private lenders before contacting charity.
Among the almost two hundred loans that the New York Charity
Organization Society made from its Self-Support Loan Fund between
1903 and 1917, more than 10 percent were to pay off previously contracted
debts to private moneylenders. Nonetheless, many roads led back to the
Charity Organization Society. The Laffertys, the Gruzinskys, and the
Yorks all ﬁrst approached other organizations, which referred them to
the Society. The Russell Sage Foundation also referred loan shark victims
to the Society for help paying off their debts.43
The Society viewed its lending as the antithesis of loan sharking. It
charged no interest and, therefore, avoided the greatest evil of the loan
shark: usury. Loan sharks and philanthropic lenders engaged in different
lending practices and served distinct but overlapping sections of the
working-class credit market. However, even though the Society painted
private moneylenders as enemies of its cause, loan sharks and scientiﬁc
charity reformers were linked through their relationships with poor bor-
rowers and in their shared distaste for government involvement in the pri-
vate realm of working-class ﬁnances.
42. R619 Folder, Box 265, CSSC (Lafferty). On the difﬁculties of landlords with poor
tenants, Katz, Improving Poor People, 166.
43. Beverly Ann Stadum, Poor Women and Their Families: Hard Working Charity Cases,
1900–1930 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), xix. The Society made 190
loans through the Fund, of which 25 or more were for the purpose of paying off other debts.
Self-Support Loan Fund 1907–11 & Self-Support Loan Fund 1911–17 Folders, Box 159,
CSSC. For borrowers referred to the Society by the Russell Sage Foundation, see Arthur
Ham to Mary Opperman, December 13, 1910, “New York - S.L., 1911–1913 Loan Shark
Victims [2]” Folder, box 39, RSF LOC; Arthur Ham to W.F. Persons, September 8,
1910, “New York - S.L., 1911–1913 Loan Shark Victims [3]” Folder, box 39, ibid.
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III. The (Credit) Worthy Poor: Borrowing from Scientiﬁc Charity
Historians of Progressive-era poverty and charity have largely overlooked
organized charity’s campaign to reform small-scale lending and to provide
loans to the poor. The literature describes charities dispensing relief, either
cash or in-kind, but not making loans. In New York, however, organized
charity both provided credit and supported the campaign to combat the
loan shark evil. Charitable organizations across the country, including
the New York Society and the New York Association for Improving the
Condition of the Poor, made loans to poor borrowers. As much as 10 per-
cent of all relief dispensed by the New York Charity Organization Society
was provided in the form of credit. These credit relationships were not
ancillary to the goals of organized charity, but were fundamental to its
relief mission. Philanthropic or “remedial” loans allowed charity workers
to exert a greater degree of control over poor people’s ﬁnances and to
keep charity recipients from frittering away large sums of money on exces-
sive interest payments. (Relief, after all, did considerably less good if a
large portion of the household’s income went to paying usurious interest
to a loan shark.)44
The Society’s move into the lending business was rooted in its long-
standing anxiety about the relationship between charity and the causes of
poverty and pauperism. Organized charity leaders believed that a poor
person could become “pauperized”—dependent, idle, and lacking self-
respect—as the result of unscientiﬁc, sentimental administration of relief.
The Society therefore charged “friendly visitors,” mostly middle-class
44. As historian Michael Katz has observed, “the role of credit as a form of relief never
has received the attention it deserves from students of poverty.” Michael B. Katz, In the
Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America (New York:
BasicBooks, 1986), 9. A few sources mention the existence of remedial loan societies
such as the New York Charity Organization Society’s Provident Loan Society. This study
is the ﬁrst to explore lending by charities directly to poor families, as an alternative to, or
in addition to, monetary or in-kind relief. The Association for Improving the Condition of
the Poor also made loans, although the number is unclear. Secretary of the Investigation
Bureau to Frank Persons, September 21, 1914, Self-Support Loan Fund 1911–17 Folder,
Box 159, CSSC. Most remedial lending came into existence through the efforts of organized
charity. Frank Tucker, “The Social Need for Remedial Loan Associations,” in Proceedings
of the National Federation of Remedial Loan Associations (Baltimore: Lucas Brothers, Inc.,
1909), 22–27. On the amount and type of relief disbursed by the Society, see Lilian Brandt,
The Charity Organization Society of the City of New York, 1882–1907 (New York: B.H.
Tyrrel, 1907), 102. As sociologist Viviana Zelizer has argued, the provision of cash relief,
rather than merely in-kind assistance, was also appealing to social reformers because it pro-
vided an opportunity for reformers to educate the poor to be responsible consumers while
allowing poor people to participate, with supervision, in the consumer economy. Viviana
A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 146–47.
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female volunteers who dropped in on poor families that requested assist-
ance, with separating the “worthy” from the “unworthy” poor.45 Loans,
reformers believed, were a form of relief that was less likely than charity
to “pauperize” recipients. Lending to the poor avoided the potentially
negative effects of charity, in favor of a contractual bargain between market
participants. As one lending reformer explained, lending “has not the
pauperizing effect of mere charitable relief; it gives the borrower an oppor-
tunity to get himself out of his difﬁculties without losing his independent
self-respect.”46
The New York Society’s lending began with the creation of the
Provident Loan Society, a philanthropic pawnshop based on European
antecedents, which was set up in 1894 to provide poor borrowers with
an alternative to private pawnshops.47 Other charity organization societies
also set up pawnshops or other types of “remedial loan societies,” which
banded together in 1909 to form the National Federation of Remedial
45. From its founding, organized charity vocally opposed indiscriminate almsgiving. On
the founding principles of scientiﬁc charity, see Watson, The Charity Organization
Movement in the United States, 151. On the widening gap between principles and practice
of charity organization societies in the early twentieth century, see Katz, In the Shadow of
the Poorhouse, 83–84. The ﬁrst American charity organization society, modeled on the
London Charity Organization Society, appeared in Buffalo in 1877 and was quickly fol-
lowed by the founding of similar societies in other major American cities. The scientiﬁc
charity leaders were not the ﬁrst social reformers to express anxiety about “pauperism”
and charity breeding dependence. Such concerns were also prevalent among urban reformers
in the nineteenth century. See, for example, Bruce Dorsey, Reforming Men and Women:
Gender in the Antebellum City (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 50–89.
46. For quote, see “The Loan Shark Campaign” by Malcolm W. Davis (reprinted from the
NY Evening Post by the Russell Sage Foundation), April 11, 1914, “New York - S.L.,
Summaries Loan Shark Campaign” Folder, box 41, RSF LOC. Jacob Gimbel of Gimbel
Brothers department store similarly stated, of loans made by his ﬁrm to its employees:
“We are not alm-givers—we seek to strengthen manhood and womanhood, not to make it
ivy-like. Our salary-loans are to be considered as business propositions solely, wherein
we are pleased to count brain and brawn and loyalty as mighty good collateral.” Draft
remarks by Mr. Gimbel, (likely May 1911), “New York - S.L., 1911 General” Folder,
box 38, ibid. Historian Amy Stanley has observed a similar dynamic at work in nineteenth-
century urban reformers’ support of antivagrancy laws, which prevented the poor from sub-
sisting outside of the “matrix of exchange relations.” Amy Dru Stanley, From Bondage to
Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 98–137.
47. The Provident Loan Society continues to make small loans in New York City. For a
history of its early years, see Provident Loan Society of New York, The Provident Loan
Society of New York: Twenty-Fifth Anniversary, 1894–1919 (New York: The Society,
1919). On the formation of other societies, see Calder, Financing the American Dream,
124–35; John P. Caskey, Fringe Banking: Check-Cashing Outlets, Pawnshops, and the
Poor (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1994), 23–26; and Watson, The Charity
Organization Movement in the United States, 227–29.
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Loan Associations. In addition to the pawnshop, which was run as a sep-
arate business loosely afﬁliated with the Society, the Society also made
interest-free loans through its Self-Support Loan Fund and other general
relief funds. The Society made approximately 190 loans to individual bor-
rowers through the Self-Support Loan Fund between 1903 and 1917. Local
ofﬁces also gave loans rather than grants. Of the $47,863 disbursed by the
Society between March and September 1907, more than 10 percent was for
loans.48
In addition to making loans directly, the Society assisted Olivia Sage,
widow of the ﬁnancier Russell Sage, to screen the many “begging letters”
that she received. These requests highlighted the need for alternative
sources of credit for the working class. So many requests were from the
victims of loan sharks that W. Frank Persons, assistant secretary of the
Society, remarked on “the apparent great demand for an organized
business, which would take care of this obvious need in the community,
under regulated and decent auspices.” In 1907, the president of the
Society assisted Olivia Sage in creating the Russell Sage Foundation, a
general-purpose foundation established for “the improvement of social
and living conditions in the United States.” Through its Division of
Remedial Loans, the Sage Foundation became a leader in the national cam-
paign against loan sharks. The Foundation drafted and lobbied for passage of
a model Uniform Small Loan Law, which proposed a 3.5 percent monthly
interest rate for small loans, well above the 6 percent annual rate allowed
under New York law. By raising the legal interest rate high enough to
make small-scale lending proﬁtable, the Foundation hoped to encourage
legitimate businesspeople to enter the market, increase competition, and
thereby drive the loan sharks out of business. The head of the Division,
Arthur Ham, also served as the secretary of the National Federation of
Remedial Loan Associations.49
48. On the National Federation of Remedial Loan Associations, see John M. Glenn, Lilian
Brandt, and F. Emerson Andrews, Russell Sage Foundation, 1907–1946, vol. 1 (New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 1947), 137. The Self-Support Loan Fund was created through a
donation by Kuhn, Loeb & Co, a New York investment bank. The Society made reports
on the use of the fund to Felix Warburg, a partner at Kuhn, Loeb & Co. The idea for this
donation may have come from Jacob Schiff, a vice president of the Charity Organization
Society, partner in Kuhn, Loeb & Co. and the New York Hebrew Free Loan Society’s big-
gest donor. Shelly Tenenbaum, “Culture and Context: The Emergence of Hebrew Free Loan
Societies in the United States,” Social Science History 13 (1989): 227–28. The fund is
brieﬂy referenced in Brandt, The Charity Organization Society of the City of New York,
1882–1907, 101. On the Society’s disbursements, see ibid., 102.
49. On the Society’s screening of begging letters, see Ruth Crocker, Mrs. Russell Sage:
Women’s Activism and Philanthropy in Gilded Age and Progressive Era America
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 205–11. For the Sage Foundation’s motto
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Obtaining a loan from the Society was not signiﬁcantly different from
obtaining cash or in-kind relief. Investigation was always the ﬁrst step.
The Society interviewed the applicant to get information on the family
composition, housing situation, and religious and national background.
They also gathered information on other potential sources of relief, includ-
ing relatives, insurance policies, and ties to other community organizations
that might provide assistance. Applicants had little expectation of privacy
in this process. The same networks upon which families relied for support
could be turned against them in the investigation process. Family members,
religious organizations, other charities, doctors, hospitals, neighbors, for-
mer employers, and local merchants all cooperated with the Society;
only one out of dozens of ﬁles contained a refusal to go along with the
Society’s investigation.50
and the Persons quote, see Glenn, Brandt, and Andrews, Russell Sage Foundation, 1907–
1946, 1:11, 66 n.1. On the Foundation’s leadership in the anti-loan shark campaign, see
Michelman, Consumer Finance, 76; Glenn, Brandt, and Andrews, Russell Sage
Foundation, 1907–1946, 1:136–51. On the involvement of the Sage Foundation in drafting
and securing the passage of the Uniform Small Loan Law in several states, see Elisabeth
Anderson, “Experts, Ideas, and Policy Change: The Russell Sage Foundation and Small
Loan Reform, 1909–1941,” Theory and Society 37 (2008): 271–310; and Calder,
Financing the American Dream, 111–55. Although anti-loan shark reformers were aware
that economic regulations could be invalidated on liberty of contract grounds, there is no
evidence that this awareness motivated reformers to reject more rigid regulation as the
means to eliminate the loan shark problem. Ansley Wilcox to Governor John A. Dix
(New York), June 5, 1911, “New York - S.L., 1911 General” Folder, box 38, RSF LOC
(expressing opinion that law prohibiting salary loans would be an unconstitutional interfer-
ence with “liberty of contract”); Walter Heilborn to William C. Osborne, June 3, 1911, ibid.
Reformers generally explained the reasoning behind their proposals in social and economic,
rather than legal, terms. When they did mention constitutional concerns, they were almost as
an afterthought.
50. For a satirical commentary on the behavior of organized charity visitors, see Florence
Converse, “Company Manners,” The Atlantic Monthly, January 1898, 130–36. Converse’s
short story describes the efforts of the young daughter of an organized charity recipient to
“behave like a lady” while visiting the home of a friendly visitor. The daughter proceeds
to interrogate the family with questions that she has heard charity workers ask of her own
mother, such as “How many members of your family are earning money at present?”,
“Has your husband any bad habits?”, and “How many people sleep in this room?” In
1886, poet John Boyle O’Reilly penned a similar critique in verse: “[t]he organized charity,
scrimped and iced, / In the name of cautious, statistical Christ.” John Boyle O’Reilly, In
Bohemia (Boston: The Pilot Publishing Company, 1886), 15. In response to a request by
the Society to verify the Laffertys’ marriage, the Reverend Cusack of Saint Stephen’s
Roman Catholic Church replied, “it is a rule of the parish that no information of marriages
be given to anyone but the parties to the contract or by their order.” R619 Folder, Box 265,
CSSC.
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Families judged “deserving,” “honest,” “reliable,” “worthy,” “obliging,”
“honorable” or “respectable” might receive aid. Others who, in the Society’s
opinion, “should be self supporting” or “if left to themselves. . . will be able
tomanage,”were not helped. An applicant’s gratitude andworthiness were clo-
sely linked; a sense of entitlement to assistance was frowned upon. Visitors
noted when a family member “was anything but appreciative,” “proved ungra-
teful for assistance,” or “seemed to expect a good deal more should be done.”
Some borrowers were attuned to the Society’s expectations, and wisely tailored
their behavior tomeet them.Mary Lafferty repeatedly expressed how “grateful”
shewas for “all the attention and kindness shownher” and “for the interest taken
by Society.” She also used the Society’s resources to further her own goals,
which were to track down her husband and reunite her family. When she was
later in need in 1908, however, she appealed ﬁrst to the New York Tribune
for aid in moving rather than to the Society.51
Most borrowers maintained a veneer of gratitude, but sometimes frustra-
tion and annoyance seeped out or exploded. Borrower Harry Roland wrote
to the Society, objecting to their collection methods. “I was very much sur-
prised,” he wrote, “to learn that you had visited certain people and told
them about my indebtedness to you and that you wanted the money, and
I hasten to assure you that no one wants to be out of debt quicker then
the writer and I had every reason to believe that such would be the case
before this, on or about the time you loaned me the sum of twenty ﬁve dol-
lars I had to accept a temporary position at twelve dollars per week, it
lasted until two (2) weeks ago last Saturday or Feby 19th.” According to
the Society, the matriarch of this family was similarly “impertinent.” On
one visit, she “shut the door without answering any further questions.”
On another, she seemed “very much annoyed on seeing visitor, and tried
to shut the door in her face. She pretended not to understand English,
but visitor feels that she knows every word that is said. She began to mum-
ble in broken English that her daughter could not pay the loan, and did not
51. On the importance of gratitude and the punishment of independence or lack of defer-
ence by the Society, see Katz, “The History of an Impudent Poor Woman in New York City
from 1918 to 1923.” For the quoted visitor case notes, see R717 Folder, Box 269, CSSC
(“was anything but appreciative”); R701 Folder, Box 268, CSSC (“proved ungrateful. . .”);
R619 Folder, Box 265, CSSC (“seemed to expect. . .”). There has been considerable debate
among historians concerning the intended purpose of poor relief. See, for example, Walter I.
Trattner, ed., Social Welfare or Social Control?: Some Historical Reﬂections on Regulating
the Poor (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983). I do not attempt to rehash or
resolve that debate here. Aid recipients’ use of the Society to structure their family relation-
ships, by hunting down deserting husbands or forcing an idle husband to seek work, is noted
in Dawn Greeley, “Beyond Benevolence: Gender, Class and the Development of Scientiﬁc
Charity in New York City, 1882–1935” (PhD diss., State University of New York at Stony
Brook, 1995), 307.
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see why she is troubled.” The woman’s daughter, Harry Roland’s wife, was
more open to the Society’s inquiries, but also had her limits. The visitor
observed that she “became somewhat impatient, and seemed to be very
unappreciative of agents efforts in her behalf” after the visitor again
urged her to save something toward payment of the loan.52
Loans came with further supervision and instructions on how the assist-
ance should be used. In 1910, Mary Lafferty received a loan from the
Society for moving expenses, conditioned on her promise to visit the
local tuberculosis clinic and send her son, Harold, to the municipal tuber-
culosis sanitorium in Otisville, New York. The Society agreed to provide
another mother with milk and eggs every week, but only if used for her
personal consumption. She was also instructed to walk “for a half an
hour each ﬁne day in the open air.” If she did not show improvement in
her health in a month, relief would be discontinued as “useless.” Money
for moving expenses was similarly refused if the Society did not approve
of the rooms selected.53
If the Society suspected that a borrower was holding out or not making a
genuine effort to repay, its collection tactics could be aggressive. The
Roland family, which used insurance policies worth $1168 as security
for loan of $25, asked the Society to return one of the policies, which
matured on the insured’s seventy-ﬁfth birthday. The Society refused to
return “any of the insurance papers until family make some effort to return
some of the money.” When the York family failed to repay their loan, the
Society visitor, “[i]nformed Mr. Y. that he would be expected to repay
loan, and if he did not do so voluntarily, [the Society] would make it as
uncomfortable for him as possible.” These threats were mostly bark with
no bite. There is no record of the Society garnishing borrowers’ wages,
for example. The Society relied upon persuasion and guilt, pressing on
the borrower’s sense of moral obligation. The assistant secretary of the
Society wrote to one borrower: “Do you think it is quite a manly thing
to utterly disregard the effort which others have made to assist you at a
52. Roland to Mrs. C.L. Reeds (C.O.S.), March 9, 1904, R624 Folder, Box 265, CSSC.
Roland also took issue with the Society’s insistence that the family move. He wrote: “My
family has not seen a well day since I left Washington Ave _ You may get cheap places
but the Doctor’s bill is much greater then the difference in rent, I was two (2) months in
Stebbins Ave house, it cost me 500 per month for Doctor’s services, it cost me $650 per
ton of coal it cost me E30 per day for oil to heat the house besides my gas, when ﬁgured
out, would it not have been better for me to pay the landlord the money you loaned me
and kept my family well? I wanted to do so but you insisted upon me moving to a cheaper
place, I done so, and I have pictured truthfully herein the results.” Ibid.
53. R619 Folder, Box 265, CSSC (Lafferty); R709 Folder, Box 269, CSSC (milk and
eggs).
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time when there was illness in your family and when, as you stated, there
was no other place to which you could go to make application for help?
Personally I am not only greatly surprised but greatly disappointed that
you should have so betrayed my conﬁdence.”54
The success of these collection methods depended upon the borrower’s
sense of obligation. One borrower who was “anxious to pay her indebted-
ness,” offered to pay 50¢ per week out of the $1.60 per week that the
family had set aside for food. In contrast, Elizabeth York, who felt “little
responsibility” about the loan owed to the Society, was largely immune to
the Society’s collection methods.55
Private moneylenders had other means of exacting payment, although
they also relied upon extralegal sanctions and borrowers’ desire to protect
employment and reputation. However, unlike the Society’s lending oper-
ations, these transactions took place outside of the law or in its shadow.
IV. Marginal Enterprises: Borrowing from Loan Sharks
The business of lending small sums to working-class borrowers was not an
invention of the early twentieth century. Pawnshops or “hock shops” had
existed in America well prior to independence. Pawnshops remained practi-
cally the only source of credit for the working class in the antebellum period,
until loans secured by a lien on movable property such as the borrower’s
jewelry or furniture, known as “chattel loans,” became available after the
Civil War. Commercial banks, however, “showed little interest in extending
personal loans to low-income, high-risk working-class borrowers” and immi-
grant bankers, although they did loan small sums, usually assisted only per-
sonal acquaintances. Working-class borrowers in the early twentieth century
had three for-proﬁt sources for small loans: pawnbrokers, chattel loan com-
panies, and salary lenders. Those with personal possessions to pledge could
borrow from a pawnbroker or chattel lender. Those with a steady income
could borrow against their future wages from a salary lender.56
54. R624 Folder, Box 265, CSSC (Roland); R701 Folder, Box 268, CSSC (York); R717
Folder, Box 269, CSSC (assistant secretary letter to borrower dated May 7, 1907).
55. R729 Folder, Box 270, CSSC (anxious borrower, whose total family weekly income
was $6); R701 Folder, Box 268, CSSC (York).
56. On pawning in early America, see Wendy A. Woloson, “In Hock: Pawning in Early
America,” Journal of the Early Republic 27 (2007): 35–81. Woloson dates the earliest refer-
ence to pawning in America to 1657. Ibid., 37. Pawnbrokers and chattel lenders both make
loans secured by movable personal property. In the case of pawnshops, the collateral or
“pledge” is a “live” pledge, meaning that it remains in the possession of the lender during
the course of the loan. The borrower retains ownership, but not possession. In contrast,
Law and History Review, November 20121084
Pawning was relatively straightforward, especially when compared with
borrowing from a salary lender or chattel loan ofﬁce. The loan could be
completed in a matter of minutes. The pawnbroker would appraise the
item to be pawned, write out a ticket for the item, and hand over the
money. The collateral, which ranged from clothing to work tools to jew-
elry, would remain in the lender’s possession until repayment. The size
of the loan mostly depended upon how much the item could fetch at auc-
tion, should the borrower default. The borrower did not sign any docu-
ments; if a borrower failed to repay the loan after a certain period of
time, the lender could sell the item, but had no recourse to the borrower’s
wages or other personal possessions.57
The ease of pawning made it an attractive form of credit. Both Mary
Lafferty and Anna Gruzinsky pawned their most valuable possessions
before turning to the Charity Organization Society for assistance. Indeed,
some borrowers made a regular practice of pawning items that were not
needed on a weekly basis. A Tree Grows In Brooklyn, Betty Smith’s semi-
autobiographical novel, vividly describes the Saturday pawning ritual in
Williamsburg, Brooklyn in the ﬁrst decades of the twentieth century:
“About four o’clock the ﬂats in the tenements . . . came to life. . . .
Women came in with bulky hock-shop bundles. The man’s Sunday suit
was home again. On Monday, it would go back to the pawnbroker’s for
another week. The hock-shop prospered on the weekly interest money
and the suit beneﬁted by being brushed and hung away in camphor
where the moths couldn’t get at it. In on Monday, out on Saturday. Ten
cents’ interest paid to Uncle Timmy. That was the cycle.”58
chattel lenders do not take possession of the pledge during the course of the loan. As in the
case of a home mortgage loan, the pledge is “dead,” meaning that the borrower remains in
possession. For more on “dead” and “live” pledges, see Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of
American Law, 3rd ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 179. On the lack of lending
by commercial banks, see Shergold, “The Loan Shark: The Small Loan Business in Early
Twentieth-Century Pittsburgh,” 199. The “generally informal and personal manner of mak-
ing loans” employed by most immigrant banks is described in the 1911 Report of the Senate
Immigration Commission. United States Senate, Reports of the Immigration Commission:
Immigrant Banks, 61st Congress, 3rd Session, vol. 37, Senate Doc. 753 (1911), 245. For
a history of immigrant banking, see Jared N. Day, “Credit, Capital and Community:
Informal Banking in Immigrant Communities in the United States 1880–1924,” Financial
History Review 9, no. 1 (2002): 65–78. On sources of credit for the working class, see
Ham, “A Year’s Progress in Remedial Loan Work,” 488. For a broad overview of the
business practices of pawnshops, loan sharks and installment sellers in the early twentieth
century, see Calder, Financing the American Dream, 42–58.
57. Ibid., 47–48.
58. Betty Smith, A Tree Grows in Brooklyn (1943; repr. New York: Harper & Row, 1968),
26–27. The familiarity between borrower and pawnbroker was reﬂected in the language of
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Borrowing from a loan shark was more complicated. Progressive-era loan
sharks were not gangsters. Although they operated in the shadows, they did
not threaten borrowers with broken kneecaps or sleeping with the ﬁshes.
Instead, they used law as a weapon, capitalizing upon loopholes and legal
ﬁctions, and turning courts’ defense of borrowers’ contractual “rights” to
their own advantage, to extract payment from delinquent debtors. Loan
sharks’ business methods were shaped by law, if not always law abiding.
John Doherty’s transaction illustrates how borrowing from loan sharks
worked, and the ways that law was used as a sword and a shield.59
Obtaining a salary or chattel loan was more elaborate than pawning, but
less invasive of personal privacy than borrowing from organized charity.
The borrower answered questions about past and present employment,
wages, and other loans. The lender then investigated to conﬁrm whether
the borrower was a good credit risk. The rise of large corporate employers,
with well-organized payroll departments, facilitated easy and efﬁcient
investigation of borrowers. A number of these large ﬁrms, however,
would discharge an employee if a wage assignment was ﬁled. Borrowers
whose employers did not allow wage assignments were therefore particu-
larly good credit risks because they would do anything to avoid the lender
initiating collection efforts through their employer.60
Chattel and salary loans were not always approved. Borrowers might be
turned down for having “too many loans,” having “loans at other places,”
owing “bills in the neighborhood,” or being “too poor.” If approved, bor-
rowers had to sign complicated documents to secure the loan, usually at
the borrowers, who would sometimes refer to the pawnbroker as “uncle” or “my uncle.”
Caskey, Fringe Banking, 18.
59. Loan sharking did not become associated with racketeering and sinister criminal enter-
prise until the 1930s. Haller and Alviti, “Loansharking in American Cities.”Most salary loan
borrowers were married men, but women also borrowed. Indeed, some loan ofﬁces mailed
out specialized solicitation letters to drum up business from salaried “[l]adies holding high
class positions.” Wassam, The Salary Loan Business in New York City, 25, 46–47.
60. One loan ofﬁce manager noted that “many of the patrons of the shark, actually pre-
ferred the shark. They willingly paid his usurious rates rather than submit to the condescend-
ing treatment of their would-be benefactors. They valued their self-respect above what they
might save by its forfeiture. They wanted to be treated as if they were paying for value
received and not as if objects of charity.” “Touching Upon and Appertaining to the Loan
Shark” by R.W. Sharp, May 15, 1917, “New York - S.L., Summaries” Folder, box 41,
RSF LOC. On a typical visit to a loan ofﬁce and the credit risks of borrowers, see
Calder, Financing the American Dream, 53–54. On corporate employers facilitating more
efﬁcient investigation of salary loan applicants, see Easterly, “Your Job Is Your Credit:
Creating a Market for Loans to Salaried Employees in New York City, 1885–1920,”
65–67. On employer discharge policies, see Glenn, Brandt, and Andrews, Russell Sage
Foundation, 1907–1946, 1:140; and “Business Men Begin War on Loan Sharks,”
New York Times, May 19, 1911, 6.
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sky-high rates of interest. These loan documents were sometimes missing
key terms or were so dense and legalistic that they obscured the nature of
the document. The power of attorney signed by Doherty is a prime
example of such subterfuge.61
Borrowers were discouraged from reading the documents they signed.
One study found that the “manner in which the papers are often arranged
for signature makes the reading of them impossible. They are either so
folded [] that their character is concealed or arranged under other papers
so that the entire document is covered except for the space for the signa-
ture.” Borrowers who did inquire were met with the “ﬁrm assurance of
the manager that the paper is of no practical value, that it is only a necess-
ary form which must be carried out in order to make the transaction legal.”
The borrowing experiences of Doherty and another borrower, Harry
Powers, were eerily similar. Powers also did not read the papers that he
signed at the loan ofﬁce: “I didn’t look them over at all. I just simply
signed where I was told to put my signature.” In May 1912, Powers,
who earned $20 per week working for a Manhattan printer, borrowed
$11.50 from Burt Brothers, a loan sharking operation near the intersection
of Fifth Avenue and 15th Street, in exchange for the promise to repay the
loan plus $4.50 in fees and interest over the course of two months. Powers’
annual interest rate was also well above the legal rate in New York State.62
Loan sharks generally strove to keep out of the press and to shield them-
selves from public scrutiny. The Chesterkirk Company, from which John
Doherty obtained his loan, employed a number of the tricks common
among loan sharks in New York. First, the owners of Chesterkirk tried
to conceal their identities. They operated the business under the trade
name “R.C. Chesterkirk,” implying that the business was owned by some-
one named Chesterkirk. The real owner was the State Trading Corporation,
another corporate mask. State Trading also owned another brokerage in
New York City, which operated under the trade name “Walter Graham.”
These corporate cloaks hid the three individual owners from open public
scrutiny and kept their names out of the newspapers.63
61. For a sampling of reasons for refusing loans taken from the records of a loan company,
see Wassam, The Salary Loan Business in New York City, 67, Appendix XXIII.
62. Ibid., 67–68. On Harry Powers, see Trial transcript, People v. Bauman, 155 A.D. 935
(N.Y. App. Div. 1913), NYSL. Powers’ effective annual interest rate including fees
(543.3405 percent) is calculated according to the standards for determining the annualized
percentage rate (APR) for a closed-end credit transaction set forth in Regulation Z of the
federal Truth in Lending Act. See 12 C.F.R. Part 226, Appendix J (rules for calculating
APR for closed-end credit).
63. The naming ploy was effective. One borrower reported to the Society that he had
sought a loan at the ofﬁces of a “Mr. Chesterkirk.” Statement of Franclyn H. Wood to
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The Chesterkirk Company employed another common strategy for evad-
ing usury laws. Chesterkirk did not make loans directly, but operated as a
broker for lenders such as H.A. Courtright of Providence, Rhode Island.
Although the Chesterkirk ofﬁce was in New York City, its loans were actu-
ally contracted in Rhode Island or Maine, where usury prohibitions were
relaxed. The complex form of the transaction served to disguise a salary
loan negotiated and ﬁnalized in New York as an out-of-state transaction,
cloaking it in the law of a less-vigilant jurisdiction. Other salary lenders
structured loans as salary purchases or wage assignments to evade usury
restrictions. In these transactions, rather than making a loan, the lender
would agree to buy the borrower’s future wages; the lender might pay
the borrower $140 in exchange for the borrower’s promise to assign the
lender his wages, which were $125 per month. As one Sage Foundation
ofﬁcial concluded, lenders did “not as a rule openly violate the usury
law.” Instead, they cleverly evaded it. Regulating lending was like playing
whack-a-mole: one form of usurious lending was shut down and another
scheme popped up to get around the newly enacted law. The business of
lending had moved from a local to a national scale, but the scope of regu-
lation did not similarly expand from the state to the federal level.64
If a borrower defaulted, the lender could go after his or her wages or the
mortgaged property. Or the lender might offer to renew or reﬁnance the
C.O.S., July 27, 1910, “New York - S.L., 1909–1915 General” Folder, box 41, RSF LOC.
The incorporators of the State Trading Corporation were A.L. Goldshear of Boston, M.F.
Valpey of Providence, Rhode Island, and Robert E. McGowan of New York City.
Wassam, The Salary Loan Business in New York City, 64–65; Trow Co-partnership and
Corporation Directory of the City of New York, 743. The owners remain shadowy ﬁgures.
Attempts to locate additional information concerning the state trading incorporators have
yielded nothing.
64. For an example of a salary loan masquerading as a wage assignment, see D.H. Tolman
v. Union Casualty & Surety Co., 90 Mo. App. 274 (Mo. Ct. App. 1901) (holding that a wage
assignment was “nothing more than a shift or ruse to evade the statutes against usury” and
void as usurious). Not only did lenders segment their operations to transact different pieces
of the loan in different jurisdictions, they also opened ofﬁces in different states. Wassam
noted that the loan application form used by a salary loan broker in Philadelphia was “prac-
tically the same as those used in New York city since several of the loan brokers have ofﬁces
in both cities.” Wassam, The Salary Loan Business in New York City, 93–95 (Appendix I).
New York’s usury regulations thus had the perverse effect of spreading the unsavory loan
sharking business beyond the state’s borders and the limits of its laws, rather than curbing
or halting it entirely. On the similar effect of New York’s regulations on the trade in porno-
graphy, see Donna Dennis, Licentious Gotham: Erotic Publishing and Its Prosecution in
Nineteenth-Century New York (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). For
Foundation quote, see “Memo. for Mr. Ashley [Wilcox],” July 1911, “New York - S.L.,
1911 General” Folder, Box 38, RSF LOC.
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loan for another term, tacking on additional fees while charging interest on
the new higher loan value. Loan sharks were expert in the legal bluff, using
borrowers’ lack of legal sophistication against them. Often the appearance
of legality was all that was required to extract payment. Excerpts from an
instruction manual prepared by a loan ofﬁce for its branch managers illus-
trate the strategy. The manual advised:
Use ’soft soap’ talk on the borrower only after you have tried stones and
gravel. If the customer mentions the law, hunch your shoulders and say
you don’t know much about it. . ..
Bluff the borrower by rattling papers in your desk, pretend to phone to an
attorney, but hold the phone closed; remember the whole proceeding is more
or less a bluff. Give your customer good hard roasts. . .
We need managers with ’bulldog’ determination. Get some attorney who
will sell you his letterheads, and then write to slow customers upon them.
Lenders sent borrowers “legal looking” documents with titles such as
“Notice of Judgment,” “Original Notice before Suit,” and “Ultimo
Notitia[sic]” to imply that collection attempts by the loan ofﬁce were actu-
ally court-issued warnings. Some, such as Doherty’s creditor, went straight
to the borrower’s employer with an executed wage assignment.65
To discourage legal challenges, lenders also might present the employer
with a list of court decisions afﬁrming the “absolute right” of all employees
to assign their wages. Chesterkirk advised borrowers’ employers that the
“highest Courts of Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
New York, and other states have decided that every employee has an absol-
ute right to assign wages which he has earned and also wages which he
expects to earn, and that the employer, in such cases, is bound to pay
such wages as they accrue to the assignee.” A string of case citations fol-
lowed, calculated to discourage further investigation into the limits of len-
ders’ collection rights.66
The Law of the Loan Shark in the Lochner Era
Because debt collection disputes infrequently ended up before a judge,
courts’ inﬂuence on working-class borrowers is difﬁcult to discern in
most cases. Loan sharks preferred to rely on unofﬁcial collection methods,
65. These tactics are described in John E. Taylor, “Loan Shark Agencies,” Bulletin of the
National Federation of Remedial Loan Associations 7 (1915): 46–49.
66. For sample collection letters from Chesterkirk, see Record on Appeal, Thompson
v. Erie Railroad Co., 207 N.Y. 171 (1912), Box 553, Vol. 127, Series J2002-82A,
NYSA (Exhibit 4); Record on Appeal, Thompson v. Gimbel Brothers, 207 N.Y. 659
(1912), ibid. (Exhibits 2c, 3d).
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or to ﬁle wage assignments that allowed them to collect wages directly
from debtors’ employers. Although lenders freely cited judicial opinions
to discourage legal challenges to their right to collect, they rarely tested
the legality of their loan contracts in court. One journalist observed that
the “loan shark seldom sues. There are only two cases on record in
New York State. When he threatens suit it is only a bluff. Met by a repu-
table attorney, he compromises or drops the case entirely. He wants neither
litigation nor intelligent inquiry.”67
Yet, lenders sometimes deemed court necessary. In these cases, loan
sharks’ clever methods of evading usury laws somewhat evened the playing
ﬁeld. Even if the loan was illegal, the many forms and borrower signatures
gave an air of legality to the transaction. Moreover, the lenders’ version of
the facts would often go unchallenged; borrowers were reluctant to go to
court to defend themselves, for fear of public exposure as debtors. Further,
lenders could avoid the adversary process entirely by ﬁling a confession of
judgment against the borrower, allowing the lender to garnish the borrower’s
wages to recover the outstanding debt plus $15 in court costs.68
Of the small number of cases that reached a judge, few raised legal ques-
tions that brought judicial discretion into play. In the absence of fraud, dur-
ess, or contract terms that violated “public policy,” courts favored
enforcing contracts as written. Progressive-era judges would inquire into
the fairness or equality of private bargains only in rare cases. Courts had
67. Between 1904 and 1911, the business methods of New York City loan sharks were
rarely challenged in court, except in a small number of civil debt collection cases.
Following amendment of the penal law in 1904, the Manhattan district attorney declined
to prosecute salary lenders for violation of state usury laws because he assumed that viola-
tion of the interest rate cap on salary loans was no longer punishable as a criminal misde-
meanor. Prosecutions resumed in 1911 when a judge made clear that a similar provision
in the banking law could be used to prosecute usurious lending. Easterly, “Your Job Is
Your Credit: Creating a Market for Loans to Salaried Employees in New York City,
1885–1920,” 164–65. On lenders and borrowers reluctant to expose themselves to judicial
scrutiny, see Richard Barry, “The Way of the Salary Loan Shark” (published in Santa Fe
Employes’ Magazine, 39–49), January 1910, “New York - S.L., Summaries Loan Shark
Campaign” Folder, box 41, RSF LOC.
68. On salary lenders’ general reluctance to defend against legal challenges to their tactics,
see Michelman, Consumer Finance, 76. On collection tactics, see Calder, Financing the
American Dream, 54. On how judges approached these cases, see Haller and Alviti,
“Loansharking in American Cities,” 127. Upon ﬁling of a confession of judgment, the
New York Code of Civil Procedure required the clerk of the court to issue an execution
and add $15 in costs to the amount of the note. One lender made a regular practice of
ﬁling confessed judgments and then garnishing the borrower’s wages for the outstanding
debt plus costs. Russell Sage Foundation Agent to J.G. Hines (Chief Clerk, License
Bureau, Comptroller’s Ofﬁce), June 22, 1911, “New York - S.L., 1911 General” Folder,
box 38, RSF LOC.
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some leeway in deciding whether contract terms were unenforceable on
policy grounds, but often erred on the side of enforcement. “[W]hat public
policy requires is often a vague and difﬁcult inquiry,” New York’s highest
court explained in 1887. “It is clear that public policy and the interests of
society favor the utmost freedom of contract, within the law, and require
that business transactions should not be trammeled by unnecessary
restrictions.”69
Judges inﬂuenced the debt collection process at the margins, by constru-
ing the meaning of loan contracts and of state disclosure and licensing
regulations. In the rare cases in which small-scale lending questions
reached the courts and presented novel questions of law, judges carefully
considered the dictates of public policy and the reach of common law
defenses to enforcement of loan contracts. Many shared the anti-loan
shark campaign’s view that excessive governmental entanglement in pri-
vate economic affairs could do more harm than good. Applying the com-
mon law of contracts, judges narrowed the defenses available to those
opposing enforcement of loan agreements. For example, although
New York law provided that usurious loans were void, judges held that
only the borrower could raise the defense of usury to bar collection on a
debt. A borrower’s employer defending against a wage garnishment action
could not avoid payment on the ground that the loan was void for usury.
This defense was available only to the borrower. In these cases, courts
would enforce the terms of the bargain as written.70
In some instances, courts treated governmental interference with pri-
vate contracts as more than simply undesirable on policy grounds; it
was potentially an unconstitutional infringement of borrowers’ liberty
of contract. Lochner-era judges expanded the limits of “freedom of con-
tract” to bar not only judicial meddling with private bargains through
the application of common law doctrines, but also to prohibit some
forms of legislative intervention. They concluded that “freedom of con-
tract” was a fundamental liberty, constitutionally protected from legisla-
tive infringement. In effect, courts elevated a turn-of-the-century
69. Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 422 (N.Y. 1887) (holding that promise
not to engage in match manufacturing is not void as a restraint of trade against public pol-
icy); see also Watertown Thermometer Co. v. Pool, 4 N.Y.S. 861 (App. Div. 1889) (“It is
clear that public policy and the interests of society favor the utmost freedom of contract,
within the law, and require that business transactions should not be trammeled by unnecess-
ary restriction.”).
70. Thompson v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 96 N.Y.S. 416 (App. Term 1905)
(afﬁrming judgment in favor of creditor, holding that borrower’s employer could not raise
the defense of usury to defeat a wage assignment).
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common law presumption in favor of enforcing the terms of a contract
into a constitutional right against improper state interference with private
bargains.
Doherty’s unusually complicated and prolonged legal battle reveals the
role that Lochner-era judges sometimes played in the lives of poor bor-
rowers. Doherty was unusual in that he had his day in court, unlike most
New York City borrowers. Or rather, his employer, the Erie Railroad,
had its day. Doherty’s case came before a judge because the Erie
Railroad did not ﬁre Doherty upon learning of the wage assignment, con-
trary to the longstanding practice of many employers. Instead, the railroad
hired counsel and disputed the lender’s claim all the way up to the Court of
Appeals, New York State’s highest court. Also out of the ordinary was the
bold decision of Doherty’s creditor to litigate, despite the vigorous legal
defense mounted by the railroad.71
By the time Doherty’s case came to trial in New York, state courts had
struck down as unconstitutional a handful of regulations related to private
economic decisions. The New York line of decisions stretched back to
1885, when the New York Court of Appeals invalidated a state law ban-
ning cigar manufacturing in tenements in Manhattan and Brooklyn on
constitutional grounds. The court struck down the law as an unconstitu-
tional exercise of legislative power infringing on individual liberty with-
out serving the interest of public health. In the decades that followed, the
court both upheld and struck down protective legislation depending upon
the law’s scope and relationship to the separate spheres of the home and
the market. Then, in a landmark decision in 1905, the United States
Supreme Court weighed in, objecting to the court’s broad reading of
the police power. In Lochner v. New York, the seminal case that came
to deﬁne the period up to 1937 as the Lochner Era, the United States
Supreme Court overturned a New York law that limited the working
hours of bakers, holding that it was an “unreasonable, unnecessary and
arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal lib-
erty or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem
to him appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his
family.” Two months later, the New York Court of Appeals applied
the teachings of Lochner. It struck down a licensing law for employees
71. In May 1911, after Doherty defaulted on his loan, the Erie Railroad joined with other
merchants and large employers in New York City in recommending that all businesses
rescind internal company policies requiring discharge of employees known to have borrowed
from salary lenders. “Business Men Begin War on Loan Sharks.” Chesterkirk may have
decided to pursue the case because it understood that a reform campaign threatened its
lucrative business and that it needed to take a stand.
Law and History Review, November 20121092
of plumbing ﬁrms as “an unwarranted interference with individual
freedom.”72
The lawsuits that followed John Doherty’s failure to make payment on
his loan capture New York judges at work deﬁning the meaning of “liberty
of contract,” pondering how much leeway private actors should have to set
the terms of their bargains free from the constraints of judges and legis-
lators. They also illustrate how judicial interpretation of the common law
of contracts and protection of contractual liberty against legislative interfer-
ence could turn courts into loan sharks’ allies. In Doherty’s case, Myrtle
M. Thompson, who had purchased Doherty’s debt from N.W. Hasten,
sued the Erie Railroad Company for the amount owed in the Municipal
Court in Brooklyn. The railroad argued that the creditor had not complied
with New York’s notice requirement for wage assignments and was there-
fore barred from using the courts to collect the debt. Erie lost at trial and
judgment was entered in favor of the creditor. The railroad appealed the
decision.73
Erie ﬁrst appealed to the New York Intermediate Appellate Court, hop-
ing for a reversal of the creditor’s victory at trial. The railroad lost again. In
a unanimous decision by Judge Woodward, the court accepted the credi-
tor’s claim that Doherty had “authorize[d] his agent to enter into a lawful
contract” in the state of Maine. It rejected the railroad’s defense that court
72. In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885). Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
Schnaier v. Navarre Hotel & Importation Co., 74 N.E. 561, 562 (N.Y. 1905). On economic
regulation decisions by the New York Court of Appeals before Lochner and the shift
immediately following, see Felice Batlan, “A Reevaluation of the New York Court of
Appeals: The Home, the Market, and Labor, 1885–1905,” Law & Social Inquiry 27
(Summer 2002). In 1901, for example, the Court of Appeals invalidated as unconstitutional
a prevailing wage law for public works contracts, noting that courts should bear in mind the
maxim: “the government governs best which governs the least.” People ex rel. Rodgers
v. Coler, 59 N.E. 716, 720 (N.Y. 1901). This study does not address whether Lochner
was rightly or wrongly decided. The jurisprudential philosophy behind Lochner has been
extensively debated elsewhere. See, for example, David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating
Lochner: Defending Individual Rights against Progressive Reform (Chicago: University
Of Chicago Press, 2011); Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York: Economic Regulation on
Trial (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998); Howard Gillman, The Constitution
Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1993); Owen M. Fiss, Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State,
1888–1910 (New York: Macmillan, 1993). Many Lochner revisionists have pointed out
the extent to which the Supreme Court upheld protective legislation during the “Lochner
Era,” rather than invalidating it. This study ﬁnds evidence of a similar pattern in the
New York state courts and of resonances between the regulatory approaches of courts and
reformers.
73. A salary lender was required to ﬁle a copy of a wage assignment with the borrower’s
employer within three days of “the execution of such assignment or notes and the making of
such loan or loans.” N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 42 (1909).
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enforcement of the contract was barred by the lender’s failure to comply
with New York’s notice regulation. The loan contract was valid and
enforceable as written, the court held. Doherty had a “common law”
right to enter into the contract with Blanding. (In ﬁnding for the creditor,
the court repeatedly invoked the debtor’s rights: the “right” to give a power
of attorney to a resident of Maine, the “right” to enter into a loan in Maine,
and the “right” to assign his wages). The decision made no mention of
Doherty’s testimony that he had not read the power of attorney and had
never heard of his nominal agent, Stella Blanding, who signed the loan
agreement on Doherty’s behalf. These facts had no legal consequence.
The railroad had no defense under the common law and the New York
notice regulation did not provide one either. Construing the New York
law to deny the lender its right to ﬁle an action to collect the debt, the
court held, would be a “denial of the constitutional rights of the
employees.”74
The appellate court’s decision in Doherty’s case might have been the last
word on the matter, had it not been for another New York case that was
decided the other way. While the Erie Railroad was ﬁghting its way
through the Brooklyn courts, Gimbel Brothers department store was litigat-
ing a wage assignment suit in Manhattan against the same debt buyer,
Myrtle Thompson. The Gimbel Brothers suit was closely watched by
reform organizations and concerned members of the business community
who had pledged to combat usurious lending. Gimbel Brothers had joined
the Russell Sage Foundation’s campaign to rid New York City of loan
sharks, and was represented by Walter Hilborn. Gimbel Brothers won in
the intermediate appellate court, by a narrow three to two margin.75
74. Thompson v. Erie Railroad, 147 A.D. 8, 10–11 (N.Y. App. Div. 1911) (emphasis
added). A few years before the Erie appeal, Judge Woodward also authored the court’s
opinion in Grossman v. Caminez, invalidating on constitutional grounds a state law that
barred real estate brokers from offering property for sale without the written authorization
of the property owner. Woodward wrote that the law interfered with the “right or privilege
guaranteed to citizens generally to make verbal contracts which are to be performed within a
year.” 79 A.D. 15, 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 1903). The infamous loan shark Daniel Tolman later
cited Woodward’s Grossman opinion in his brief to the New York Court of Appeals seeking
to overturn his conviction for criminal usury. Appellant’s Brief at 25, People v. Tolman, Box
582, Vol. 22, Series J2002-82A, NYSA. The Court afﬁrmed the conviction without addres-
sing Tolman’s argument that the usury law was unconstitutional. People v. Tolman, 210 N.
Y. 592 (1914).
75. Thompson v. Gimbel Brothers, 145 A. D. 436, 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1911). Gimbel
Brothers retained Hilborn to defend wage assignment cases brought against their employees.
As a former associate in Louis Brandeis’s ﬁrm, Hilborn was familiar with the “sociological
jurisprudence” of the period. In his brief for Gimbel Brothers, Hilborn made extensive use of
social science data on lending. On Gimbel Brothers’ involvement in the anti-loan shark cam-
paign, see Michelman, Consumer Finance, 76; and “Legal War Begins on Loan Sharks,”
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Both cases were then appealed to New York State’s highest court and set
to be argued on the same date. The court would decide once and for all
whether the employee’s freedom of contract should trump New York’s
lending disclosure regulation. The fates of Doherty and the Gimbel
Brothers employee-borrowers were joined. Hilborn, the lawyer for
Gimbel Brothers, was optimistic about the department store’s appeal, but
feared that the bad decision in the Erie case and the failure of Erie’s law-
yers to present empirical data to support their cause might jeopardize
Gimbel Brothers’ chances. After all, Gimbel Brothers had prevailed in
its ﬁrst appeal by a narrow margin, whereas the decision in favor of the
creditor in the Erie case was unanimous. Moreover, Judge Woodward
and the two dissenting judges in Thompson v. Gimbel Brothers all accepted
the creditor’s distorted version of the facts: that the borrower “chose to
make his bargain with the money lender in a State which has no usury
law.”76
Ultimately, Gimbel Brothers and Erie Railroad—backed by the
anti-loan shark campaign—prevailed in their objective: to bar creditors
from using the courts to enforce wage garnishments that did not comply
with statutory disclosure requirements. Confronted with an arsenal of
reports on the salary loan situation in New York that were appended
to the Gimbel Brothers brief, the court found that the disclosure law
was enacted for the protection of both employers and borrowers. It
was a reasonable exercise of the police power that served the “public
welfare” because it would “to some extent prevent improvidence and
recklessness by and fraud upon the employee.” The lender’s failure to
comply with the notice law barred it from using the courts to collect
the debt from Doherty’s employer.
In this and other cases, courts reasoned that the state could impinge on
borrowers’ contractual freedom to prevent pauperism. The United States
New York Times, January 1, 1911, 6. In 1914, the New York County district attorney’s ofﬁce
appointed Hilborn to head a newly created bureau for the prosecution of usury cases. Glenn,
Brandt, and Andrews, Russell Sage Foundation, 1907–1946, 1:140–41. Hilborn later
worked with the Russell Sage Foundation in securing the passage of the Uniform Small
Loan Law. Ibid., 1:336–39. In addition, he and his co-counsel and law partner David
Gallert also co-authored a study of small loan legislation published by the Foundation.
David J. Gallert, Walter S. Hilborn, and Geoffrey May, Small Loan Legislation: A
History of the Regulation of the Business of Lending Small Sums (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1932).
76. On Hilborn’s concerns about joining the cases on appeal, see Walter S. Heilborn
(alternate spelling of Hilborn) to Arthur Ham, May 10, 1912, “New York - S.L., 1912–
1913 General” Folder, Box 37, RSF LOC. Thompson v. Gimbel Brothers, 145 A.D. at
440 (Clarke, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court upheld a similar Massachusetts disclosure law a few
months before the New York court decided Doherty’s case. The
Supreme Court used similar language to describe the purpose of the
Massachusetts law. It was designed to prevent an improvident wage earner
from depriving his family of support and becoming “a public charge.”
With the exception of Illinois, other state courts fell in line with
Massachusetts and New York in upholding similar regulations.77
Anti-loan shark activists hailed the decision as a victory for small loan
borrowers; however, the real impact of the decision was limited. The
ambiguity in the three day notice provision—the central question
addressed in both cases—was corrected through legislative amendment
before the Court of Appeals ever ruled on the provision’s meaning.
Loan sharks were thus made to comply with a narrow, procedural regu-
lation, whereas the court did not directly address Judge Woodward’s
sweeping pronouncements on the common law “rights” of borrowers
to enter into usurious loan contracts, limitation of the defenses available
to void such bargains, and disinterest in testimony concerning the cir-
cumstances of the transaction and the subjective understanding of the
parties to the deal. Indeed, the following year a defendant in an unrelated
case cited Judge Woodward’s opinion as good law, despite its apparent
overruling, when attempting to overturn her conviction for criminal
usury. Woodward’s language continued to provide lenders with a legal
toehold to defend their practices.78
77. Note that the Court of Appeals’ opinion erroneously refers to the borrower as “John
Dougherty.” Thompson v. Erie Railroad, 207 N.Y. 171, 177–80 (1912). The Massachusetts
decision is Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225, 233 (1911). The Illinois Supreme
Court decided the other way in Massie v. Cessna, 239 Ill. 352 (1909). Minnesota afﬁrmed
the validity of a similar statute in Fay v. Bankers Surety Co., 125 Minn. 211, 216–17 (1914),
as did the Supreme Court of Tennessee in West v. Jefferson Woolen Mills, 147 Tenn. 100
(1922). As historian Charles McCurdy has observed, courts in this period upheld other
types of social legislation on similar grounds. “Prevention of pauperism” became an
accepted justiﬁcation for exercise of the police power, but remedying inequality of bargain-
ing power did not. Charles W. McCurdy, “The ‘Liberty of Contract’ Regime in American
Law,” in The State and Freedom of Contract, ed. Harry N. Scheiber (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1998), 186–87.
78. On the amendment of the wage assignment statute in 1911, which further supported
the court’s ruling for the employers, see N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 42 (1911). On reformers’
reaction to the decision, see Ham, “The Court of Appeals and the Loan Shark” (applauding
the decisions that “cut the string which lenders, operating from Portland, Me., and other
points have been able to tie upon victims in New York.”). The impact of the decision on
Doherty is unknown. Few traces of Doherty’s life, post-decision, remain in the historical
record. A man by the name of John Doherty, also born in December 1886, appears in the
World War I draft registry, but he does not resurface in either the 1920 or 1930 census
records. Like many working-class borrowers, Doherty’s life was not carefully documented
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Conclusion
Historians have usually portrayed Lochner-era courts and progressive
reformers as opponents. In the dominant narrative, progressives sought
to use the power of the state to regulate the market, whereas judges
battled to keep government in check. However, as recent scholarship
has shown, progressive reform movements were animated by a multi-
plicity of goals and ideologies, not always in harmony with one another.
The anti-loan shark campaign’s vision of the role of the state in the mar-
ket, one of many “progressivisms,” deﬁes easy categorization as “statist”
in outlook. In this case, the standard binaries—courts versus reformers,
advocates of laissez-faire versus statists—fail to capture the complex
relationship between the judiciary and the lending reform campaign.
Lending reformers looked beyond the state for solutions, relying instead
on other market participants and corporate employers to police the
small-sum lending industry. Their strategy reﬂected a private, market-
based approach, rooted in organized charity’s historic opposition to gov-
ernment involvement in the provision of poor relief and preference for
private solutions to poverty.79
Reformers fought not for greater state involvement, but rather for loos-
ening the regulatory caps on interest rates and placing limits on lender
access to the courts to collect unpaid debts. The role of the law, reformers
believed, was to level the playing ﬁeld and allow for free entry of “honest
capital.” Raising interest rate caps would encourage the growth of the
industry and the resulting competition between lenders would purge the
market of loan sharks. Private remedial lending operations would create
further competitive pressure on usurious lenders. Flooding the market
with capital would drown the sharks, reformers believed. They also sought
to use the power of private employers to police the lending industry. They
encouraged employers to refuse to honor wage assignments from loan
sharks and to raise defenses to enforcement of such debts in court. In
this way, corporate employers would provide a backstop against usurious
lending practices.
or preserved for posterity. World War I Draft Registration Card, John Doherty, Draft Board
118, New York County, New York, World War I Selective Service System Draft
Registration Cards (digital scan of NARA microﬁlm publication M1509; Roll No.
1766138), Ancestry. On the later use of Woodward’s opinion, see Appellant’s Brief at
25–28, People v. Bauman, 155 A.D. 935 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913), NYSL.
79. For a summary of the historiography on the “multiplicity” of “progressivisms,” see
Robert D. Johnston, “The Possibilities of Politics: Democracy in America, 1877 to 1917,”
in American History Now, ed. Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 2011), 100.
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Courts were likewise wary of legislative and judicial encroachment on
private bargains. Yet, they recognized that the state had a legitimate interest
in preventing improvident wage earners from becoming paupers, depen-
dent upon poor relief. This interest justiﬁed some state-imposed limits
on lenders’ right to collect unpaid debts. Judges, like reformers, envisioned
that the state would play a limited role, creating space for private power to
regulate the marketplace and protect borrowers from their own
“improvidence.”
Thus, when lending reformers and courts puzzled over how to conﬁgure
the relationship between the state and the market, they often reached simi-
lar conclusions. These progressives and state court judges were not always
at odds in how they envisioned the role of the state in the market. Instead,
overlapping and complementary intellectual currents emanating from
established legal and philanthropic circles molded the structures of law,
charity, and industry in which working-class New Yorkers borrowed and
determined the options available to those managing money on the
margins.80
80. A few scholars have examined the fate of economic regulations in the state courts. In
1985, Melvin Urofsky ﬁrst observed that the “doctrine of contract” was “was far from trium-
phant at the state level.” Carol Chomsky’s study of the Minnesota Supreme Court and Kyle
Murray’s of the Iowa Supreme Court provide further detail. For New York, there is no work
that covers the entire Lochner Era; Felice Batlan’s work ends with Lochner in 1905 and
William Nelson’s does not start until the 1920s. Melvin I. Urofsky, “State Courts and
Protective Legislation during the Progressive Era: A Reevaluation,” The Journal of
American History 72 (1985): 63–91; Carol Chomsky, “Progressive Judges in a
Progressive Age: Regulatory Legislation in the Minnesota Supreme Court, 1880–1925,”
Law and History Review 11 (1993): 383–440; Kyle T. Murray, “Looking for Lochner in
All the Wrong Places: The Iowa Supreme Court and Substantive Due Process Review,”
Iowa Law Review 84 (1999): 1141–81; Felice Batlan, “A Reevaluation of the New York
Court of Appeals: The Home, the Market, and Labor, 1885–1905,” Law and Social
Inquiry 27 (2002), 489–528. Batlan, “A Reevaluation of the New York Court of
Appeals”; and William E. Nelson, The Legalist Reformation: Law, Politics, and Ideology
in New York, 1920–1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).
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